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CHAPTER 3
Government Regulation
Nicholas A. Ashford and Charles C. Caldart
The manufacturing, processing, and use of
chemicals, materials, tools, machinery, and equip-
ment in industrial, construction, mining, and agri-
cultural workplaces are often accompanied by
environmental, health, and safety hazards and risks.
Occupational and environmental factors cause or
exacerbate major diseases of the respiratory, car-
diovascular, reproductive, and nervous system and
cause systemic poisoning and some cancers and
birth defects. Occupational and environmental dis-
ease and injury place heavy economic and social
burdens on workers, employers, citizens, and tax-
payers.
Because voluntary efforts in the unregulated
market have not succeeded historically in reducing
the incidence of these diseases and injuries, govern-
ment intervention into the activities of the private
sector has been demanded by citizens, consumers,
and workers. This intervention takes the form of
the regulation of environmental health and safety
hazards through standard setting, enforcement, and
transfer of information. This chapter addresses the
major regulatory systems (or regimes) designed to
protect public and worker health from chemicals
discharged from sources that pollute the air, water,
ground, and workplace. The setting of standards and
other legal requirements in these regulatory regimes
has occurred over a more than 30-year period that
has seen changes in the use of scientific and techni-
cal information in regulatory initiatives and in legal
doctrine, including the manner in which science,
economics, and technological capability are viewed
by the courts. The concepts of risk assessment,
cost–benefit analysis, and technology forcing have
evolved—both through the development of case law
and through changes in the political environment.
Often, changes in one of the regulatory regimes has
affected the other regulatory regimes as well.
Several themes run through the discussion of the
different regulatory systems: distinctions between
performance and design/specification standards∗;
differences in the extent to which economics or
cost are taken into account in the setting and en-
forcement of standards; and distinctions between
interventions that encourage technological innova-
tion and those that encourage diffusion of existing
technologies.
∗Actually, standards (what we will call direct controls) can
be classified in a number of ways. A performance
standard is one that specifies a particular outcome—such
as a specified emission level above which it is illegal to
emit a specified air pollutant—but does not specify how
that outcome is to be achieved. A design or specification
standard, on the other hand, specifies a particular
technology—such as a catalytic converter—that must be
used. In either case, the standard can be based on (a) a
desired level of protection for human health or
environmental quality, (b) some level of presumed
technological feasibility, (c) some level of presumed
economic feasibility, or (d) some balancing of social costs
and social benefits. Within each of these options, there is
a wide spectrum of possible approaches. A human
health-based standard, for example, might choose to
protect only the average member of the population, or it
might choose to protect the most sensitive individual. A
technology-based standard might be based on what is
deemed feasible for an entire industry, or on what is
deemed feasible for each firm within the industry.
Moreover, some standards might be based on a
combination of these factors. Many standards based on
technological feasibility, for example, are also based on
some concept of economic feasibility. Other
requirements that could be considered ”standards”
include (a) information-based obligations, such as the
disclosure of (and retention of, or provision of access to)
exposure, toxicity, chemical content, and production
data and (b) requirements to conduct testing or
screening of chemical products.
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40 SECTION I ● Work, Environment, and Health
In the United States, toxic substances in the
workplace have been regulated primarily through
three federal laws: the Mine Safety and Health Act
of 1969 (Box 3-1 and Figs. 3-1 and 3-2), the Occu-
pational Safety and Health Act (OSHAct) of 1970,
and the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) of
1976. These federal laws have remained essentially
unchanged since their passage, although serious
attempts at reform have been made from time to
time. Since 1990, sudden and accidental releases
of chemicals (chemical accidents), which may af-
fect both workers and community residents, are now
also regulated under the Clean Air Act.
The OSHAct established the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) in the
Department of Labor to enforce compliance with
BOX 3-1
Essentials of the Mine Safety and
Health Administration
James L. Weeks
The Mine Safety and Health Administration
(MSHA) in the U.S. Department of Labor has
responsibility for writing and enforcing
regulations to protect the health and safety of
the approximately 200,000 miners in the United
States. These miners work in underground and
surface mines that produce coal, metal ore,
other nonmetal commodities (such as salt and
trona), and in sand, stone, and gravel quarries.
Mining is one of the most dangerous industries
worldwide and in the United States. There are
high rates of fatal and nonfatal traumatic
injuries, occupational lung disease (coal
workers’ pneumoconiosis, silicosis, and lung
cancer), and noise-induced hearing loss.
Underground miners are also exposed to high
concentrations of exhaust from diesel engines.
Historically, federal government intervention
in mine safety and health was the responsibility
of the U.S. Bureau of Mines in the Department
of the Interior. The bureau was organized in
1910 for the purpose of investigating coal mine
disasters, and over the next six decades, it
acquired increasing authority and responsibility
to enter and inspect mines and promote mine
safety, but it had limited authority to compel
compliance with safety regulations. When
Congress passed the Federal Coal Mine Health
and Safety Act of 1969, it significantly changed
the relationship between the federal
government and the mining industry. This act
was passed after a widespread miners strike for
compensation for black lung and a spectacular
and disastrous explosion that caused 78 deaths
in a mine in West Virginia. Among other things,
the act created an agency to perform
epidemiologic research (NIOSH), an agency to
continue its engineering research and
development to develop safe mining practices
(Bureau of Mines, since then absorbed into
NIOSH), and a federal program to compensate
miners totally disabled by pneumoconiosis.
The 1969 act created the federal black lung
program to compensate miners totally disabled
by pneumoconiosis. This program has been
controversial, in part, because of the many
manifestations of disease caused by inhaling
coal mine dust. One innovative aspect of the
program is that it allowed for decisions about
eligibility when etiology was ambiguous by
establishing a series of presumptions based on
the miner’s clinical status and work history.
Originally, claims were paid out of the general
treasury, but, in 1981, claims were paid by the
operator who last employed the miner or, if
that operator could not be found, by a disability
trust fund to which operators contribute based
on their tons of coal produced. The 1969 act
also created the Mining Enforcement and
Safety Administration (MESA), which enforced
the basic structure and function of regulation
as described later.
The 1969 act was amended in 1977, with
passage of the Mine Safety and Health Act. The
1977 Mine Act moved MESA to the
Department of Labor, changed its name to
MSHA, preserved the basic structure of the
1969 act, and extended authority beyond coal
mining to all other mines and quarries. The
1977 act also required that miners receive
40 hours of training in safety and health when
first hired and 8 hours annually thereafter.
MSHA is structurally similar to OSHA but
differs in some important ways. Both agencies
write and enforce regulations, and disputes are
adjudicated by administrative law review
commissions with opportunities to appeal
decisions to federal district courts.
(continued)
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BOX 3-1
Essentials of the Mine Safety and Health
Administration (Continued)
The standards-setting language in both acts is
practically identical. Regulations covering toxic
substances must be based on the best available
evidence; must be designed to prevent material
impairment of health for all miners, even if
exposed for their entire working life; and
standards must be feasible. Consequently, for
the purpose of establishing regulations
covering exposure to hazardous substances, the
legal and scientific requirements of MSHA and
OSHA are essentially the same.
But MSHA is significantly different from
OSHA in its enforcement capabilities. Under
MSHA, underground mines must be inspected
four times and surface mines must be inspected
twice each year. Most OSHA inspections are
discretionary. Under MSHA, an inspector may,
on his or her own authority, close all or part of
a mine in case of imminent danger; the OSHA
inspector does not have this authority and must
get a court order. All mines are covered under
MSHA, without exception; under OSHA,
employers with 10 or fewer employees are
exempt from general schedule inspection. Mine
operators must submit a mine plan and have it
approved before it can produce; only with
confined spaces must employers under OSHA’s
jurisdiction obtain a permit and only then under
limited conditions. Some numerical
comparisons are informative. OSHA has
jurisdiction over approximately 100 million
workers, and MSHA has jurisdiction over less
than 250,000, even though both agencies have
approximately the same number of inspectors
(including state plans). Thus, the number of
inspectors per worker under MSHA is
approximately 400 times that under OSHA.
Information about injuries and accidents in
mining is more pertinent and more available.
Mine-specific data on the number and rates of
injuries, hours worked, and (coal) production is
reported by mine operators to MSHA every
quarter and some of it is available on the
Internet. Surveillance data on exposure to dust,
crystalline silica, other hazardous materials, and
noise is also available from MSHA. Under
OSHA, estimates of injury rates are available for
SIC (Standard Industrial Classification)
categories based on an annual survey of a
sample of employers conducted by the Bureau
of Labor Statistics. Employer-specific data are
not available. Employers must post injury data
annually, but they are not required to report it
to OSHA. OSHA or workers’ representatives
may request it from each employer, but it is not
available from a single source, as are MSHA’s
data. The accuracy and reliability of all
surveillance data, however, is not guaranteed.
Most injury and exposure data are provided by
employers and passed on by either MSHA,
OSHA, or the Bureau of Labor Statistics with
little, if any, validation.
What has this regulatory intervention into
the mining industry achieved? Before the
passage of the 1969 Coal Mine Act, the fatality
rate of U.S. miners was approximately 0.25
fatalities per 100 workers per year, four times
that of miners in Western European
coal-mining countries. For the first 10 years
after the act, it declined each year to a level
approximately the same as that in European
mines. Since then, it has declined further, so
that now, coal mines in the United States are
among the safest in the world at an annual
fatality rate of approximately 0.03 fatalities per
100 workers (see Fig. 3-2). Even so, the fatality
rate in mining remains the highest of any major
industrial group in the United States.
Trends in nonfatal injury rates are harder to
measure because occurrence of these injuries
varies significantly by occupation and among
different age and experience cohorts. Trends in
age- and experience-specific injury rates are not
available. The crude rate of nonfatal injuries in
coal mining has declined steadily, but this could
be because very few new and inexperienced
miners have been hired at the same time that
the population of working miners is getting
older and more experienced. This change in the
age and experience distribution alone could
account for the steady decline in the overall
injury rate. Mine operators also must report
certain accidents that do not cause injury but
that signal the existence of hazards that could
cause serious injury. These accidents include
nonplanned roof falls, inundations with water,
fires, and failure of ventilation.
(continued)
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BOX 3-1
Essentials of the Mine Safety and Health
Administration (Continued)
This regulatory scheme has also significantly
reduced miners’ exposure to respirable dust and
has reduced the prevalence of coal workers’
pneumoconiosis (CWP). Respirable coal mine
dust was measured at 6 to 8 mg/m3 before the
1969 act but, for the same job, declined to less
than 3 mg/m3 within 6 months and to
approximately 2 mg/m3 in another year. For
continuous mining operators, the level is now
regularly below 1 mg/m3. This progress was
achieved in spite of mine operators claiming, in
1969, that it was impossible to reduce exposure
to the statutory limit of 2 mg/m3. Exposure
remains high at some mines and with some
mining methods, such as longwall mining.
Consistent with this reduction in exposure, the
experience-adjusted prevalence of CWP has
also been reduced since passage of the 1969
and 1977 mine acts. Problems persist, however.
Noise exposure remains high, exposure to
crystalline silica is also elevated, where it is
known, and underground miners are exposed
to high levels of diesel exhaust.
MSHA’s program of surveillance and control
of exposure to respirable dust and its
enforcement of dust regulations is part of a
more comprehensive effort to prevent the
occurrence and progression of CWP. Other
aspects of this plan include a federal program
to compensate underground coal miners totally
disabled by CWP, a prospective study of a
cohort of miners, engineering research and
development on methods of monitoring and
controlling exposure to dust, and a program to
allow miners to transfer to less dusty jobs in a
mine if they have a positive chest radiograph
for CWP. All these facets of the prevention
effort are and have been controversial, but
nevertheless they contain the essential elements
for preventing occupational disease: exposure
monitoring, enforcement, disease surveillance,
right to transfer, epidemiologic research, and
engineering research and development.
In sum, MSHA is an intensive intervention in
a dangerous industry and, as such, is a
laboratory on a number of issues important to
worker health and safety generally. One
important lesson from MSHA is that a
concerted and multifaceted effort at controlling
occupational hazards can succeed at reducing
rates of traumatic fatalities and of
pneumoconiosis. The important aspects of such
an effort include sufficient resources,
surveillance, exposure monitoring, worker
training, epidemiologic research, and
engineering research and development—all of
which are supported, in one way or another, by
regulatory authority.
the act, the National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health (NIOSH) in the Department of
Health and Human Services (under the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention) to perform re-
search and conduct health hazard evaluations, and
the independent, quasijudicial Occupational Safety
and Health Review Commission to hear employer
contests of OSHA citations. The Office of Pollu-
tion Prevention and Toxic Substances in the En-
vironmental Protection Agency (EPA) administers
TSCA. The Office of Air, Water, and Solid Waste
and the Office of Emergency Response in EPA regu-
late media-based pollution. The Office of Chemical
Preparedness and Emergency Response in EPA is
responsible for the chemical safety provisions of
the Clean Air Act.
The evolution of regulatory law under the
OSHAct has profoundly influenced other environ-
mental legislation, including the regulation of air,
water, and waste, but especially the evolution of
TSCA.
STANDARD SETTING AND
OBLIGATIONS OF THE EMPLOYER
AND THE MANUFACTURER OR
USER OF TOXIC SUBSTANCES
The Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970
The OSHAct requires OSHA to (a) encourage em-
ployers and employees to reduce hazards in the
workplace and to implement new or improved
safety and health programs, (b) develop manda-
tory job safety and health standards and enforce
them effectively, (c) establish “separate but de-
pendent responsibilities and rights” for employers
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FIGURE 3-1 ● Mine hazards such as the increased dust exposure from continuous mining machines are
regulated by the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA). (Photograph by Earl Dotter.)
and employees for the achievement of better
safety and health conditions, (d) establish re-
porting and record-keeping procedures to mon-
itor job-related injuries and illnesses, and (e)
encourage states to assume the fullest respon-
sibility for establishing and administering their
own occupational safety and health programs,
which must be at least as effective as the federal
program.
As a result of these responsibilities, OSHA in-
spects workplaces for violations of existing health
and safety standards; establishes advisory commit-
tees; holds hearings; sets new or revised standards
for control of specific substances, conditions, or
use of equipment; enforces standards by assess-
ing fines or by other legal means; and provides for
consultative services for management and for em-
ployer and employee training and education. In all
FIGURE 3-2 ● Underground bituminous coal mine fatality rates, 1959 to
1991. FTE, full-time equivalent miners. (From the Mine Safety and Health
Administration.)
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FIGURE 3-3 ● The Occupational Safety and
Health Administration’s (OSHA’s) positive impact on
general industry health and safety in the United States
unfortunately does not extend to municipal workers,
such as firefighters. (Photograph by Marvin Lewiton.)
of its procedures, from the development of stan-
dards through their implementation and enforce-
ment, OSHA guarantees employers and employees
the right to be fully informed, to participate actively,
and to appeal its decisions (although employees are
limited somewhat in the latter activity).
The coverage of the OSHAct initially extended
to all employers and their employees, except self-
employed people; family-owned and -operated
farms; state, county, and municipal workers (Fig.
3-3); and workplaces already protected by other
federal agencies or other federal statutes. In 1979,
however, Congress exempted from routine OSHA
safety inspections approximately 1.5 million busi-
nesses with 10 or fewer employees. (Exceptions to
this are allowed if workers claim there are safety
violations.) Because federal agencies (except the
U.S. Postal Service) are not subject to OSHA reg-
ulations and enforcement provisions, each agency
is required to establish and maintain its own ef-
fective and comprehensive job safety and health
program. OSHA provisions do not apply to state
and local governments in their role as employers.
OSHA requires, however, that any state desiring to
gain OSHA support or funding for its own occu-
pational safety and health program must provide
a program to cover its state and local government
workers that is at least as effective as the OSHA
program for private employees.
OSHA can begin standard-setting procedures ei-
ther on its own or on petitions from other parties,
including the Secretary of Health and Human Ser-
vices, NIOSH, state and local governments, any na-
tionally recognized standards-producing organiza-
tion, employer or labor representatives, or any other
interested person. The standard-setting process in-
volves input from advisory committees and from
NIOSH. When OSHA develops plans to propose,
amend, or delete a standard, it publishes these in-
tentions in the Federal Register. Subsequently, in-
terested parties have opportunities to present argu-
ments and pertinent evidence in writing or at public
hearings. Under certain conditions, OSHA is autho-
rized to set emergency temporary standards, which
take effect immediately, but which are to be fol-
lowed by the establishment of permanent standards
within 6 months. To set an emergency temporary
standard, OSHA must first determine that workers
are in grave danger from exposure to toxic sub-
stances or new hazards and are not adequately pro-
tected by existing standards. Both emergency tem-
porary and permanent standards can be appealed
through the federal courts, but filing an appeals pe-
tition does not delay the enforcement of the stan-
dard unless a court of appeals specifically orders
it. Employers may make application to OSHA for
a temporary variance from a standard or regulation
if they lack the means to comply readily with it,
or for a permanent variance if they can prove that
their facilities or methods of operation provide em-
ployee protection that is at least as effective as that
required by OSHA.
OSHA requires employers of more than 10 em-
ployees to maintain records of occupational injuries
and illnesses as they occur. All occupational injuries
and diseases must be recorded if they result in death,
one or more lost workdays, restriction of work or
motion, loss of consciousness, transfer to another
job, or medical treatment (other than first aid). Be-
cause this self-reported information relies on the
employer determining that injuries and illness arose
out of their “work-relatedness” at his or her facility,
injuries, but especially illnesses, are acknowledged
to be underreported.
Key OSHA Standards and Decisions
The OSHAct provides two general means of pro-
tection for workers: (a) a statutory general duty
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to provide a safe and healthful workplace, and
(b) adherence to specific standards by employers.
The act imposes on virtually every employer in the
private sector a general duty “to furnish to each of
his employees employment and a place of employ-
ment which are free from recognized hazards that
are causing or are likely to cause death or serious
physical harm. . . .” (emphasis added). A recognized
hazard may be a substance for which the likelihood
of harm has been the subject of research, giving rise
to reasonable suspicion, or a substance for which
an OSHA standard may or may not have been pro-
mulgated. The burden of proving that a particular
substance is a recognized hazard and that industrial
exposure to it results in a significant degree of expo-
sure is placed on OSHA. Because standard setting
is a slow process, protection of workers through the
employer’s general duty obligation could be espe-
cially important, but it is crucially dependent on the
existence of reliable health effects data, as well as
on the willingness of a particular OSHA adminis-
tration to use this as a vehicle for protection.
The OSHAct addresses specifically the subject
of toxic materials. It states, under Section 6(b)(5)
of the act, that the Secretary of Labor (through
OSHA), in promulgating standards dealing with
toxic materials or harmful physical agents, shall set
the standard that “most adequately assures, to the
extent feasible, on the basis of the best available
evidence that no employee will suffer material im-
pairment of health or functional capacity, even if
such employee has a regular exposure to the hazard
dealt with by such standard for the period of his
working life” (emphases added). These words indi-
cate that the issue of exposure to toxic chemicals or
carcinogens that have long latency periods, as well
as to reproductive hazards, is covered by the act in
specific terms.
In 1971, under Section 6(a) of the act, allowing
for their adoption without critical review, OSHA
initially adopted as standards the so-called per-
missible exposure limits (PELs): the 450 threshold
limit values (TLVs) recommended by the American
Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists
(ACGIH) as guidelines for protection against the
toxic effects of these materials. In the 1970s, un-
der Section 6(b), OSHA set formal standards for
asbestos, vinyl chloride, arsenic, dibromochloro-
propane, coke oven emissions, acrylonitrile, lead,
cotton dust, and a group of 14 carcinogens. In
the 1980s, OSHA regulated benzene, ethylene ox-
ide, and formaldehyde as carcinogens and reg-
ulated asbestos more rigidly as a carcinogen at
0.2 fibers/cm3. In the early 1990s, OSHA regulated
cadmium, bloodborne pathogens, glycol ethers, and
confined spaces. OSHA also lowered the PEL for
formaldehyde from 1 to 0.75 parts per million
(ppm; averaged over an 8-hour period) and issued
a process safety management (PSM) rule (see later
discussion). More recent rule-making activity by
OSHA is discussed later in this chapter.
The burden of proving the hazardous nature of
a substance is placed on OSHA, as is the require-
ment that the proposed controls are technologically
feasible. The necessarily slow and arduous task of
setting standards, substance by substance, makes it
impossible to deal realistically with 13,000 toxic
substances or approximately 250 suspect carcino-
gens on NIOSH lists. Efforts were made to stream-
line the process by (a) proposing generic standards
for carcinogens and (b) proposing a generic stan-
dard updating the TLVs (PELs). As discussed later,
neither of these efforts was successful.
The inadequacy of the 450 TLVs adopted un-
der Section 6(a) of the act is widely known. The
TLVs originated as guidelines recommended by
the ACGIH to protect the average worker from ei-
ther recognized acute effects or easily recognized
chronic effects. The standards were based on animal
toxicity data or the limited epidemiologic evidence
available at the time (1969) of the establishment of
the TLVs. They do not address sensitive popula-
tions within the workforce or those with prior ex-
posure or existing disease, nor do they address the
issues of carcinogenicity, mutagenicity, and terato-
genicity. These standards were adopted en masse
in 1971 as a part of the consensus standards that
OSHA adopted along with those dealing primarily
with safety.
As an example of the inadequacy of protection
offered by the TLVs, the 1971 TLV for vinyl chlo-
ride was set at 250 ppm, whereas the later protective
standard (see later) recommended no greater expo-
sure than 1 ppm (as an average over 8 hours)—a
level still recognized as unsafe, but the limit that
the technology could detect. Another example is the
TLV for lead, which was established at 200 µg/m3,
whereas the later lead standard was established at
50 µg/m3, also recognizing that that level was not
safe for all populations, such as pregnant women
or those with prior lead exposure. In 1997, OSHA
promulgated a new PEL for methylene chloride of
25 ppm, replacing the prior TLV of 500 ppm. The
ACGIH updates its TLV list every 2 years. Although
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useful, an updated list would have little legal signif-
icance unless formally adopted by OSHA. OSHA
did try, unsuccessfully, to adopt an updated and new
list of PELs in its Air Contaminants Standard in
1989 (see later discussion). However, OSHA con-
tinues to maintain that it is intent on revising the list.
The fact that the official OSHA TLVs are more than
30 years out of date compared with industry’s own
“voluntary” consensus standards is not welcomed,
especially by the more modern firms in industry.
Under Section 6(b) of the OSHAct, new health
standards dealing with toxic substances were to be
established using the mechanism of an open hearing
and subject to review by the U.S. Circuit Courts of
Appeals. The evolution of case law associated with
the handful of standards that OSHA promulgated
through this section of the OSHAct is worth con-
sidering in detail. The courts addressed the difficult
issue of what is adequate scientific information nec-
essary to sustain the requirement that the standards
be supported by “substantial evidence on the record
as a whole.” The cases also addressed the extent to
which economic factors were permitted or required
to be considered in the setting of the standards,
the meaning of “feasibility,” OSHA’s technology-
forcing authority, the question of whether a
cost–benefit analysis was required or permitted,
and, finally, the extent of the jurisdiction of
OSHAct in addressing different degrees of risk.
The 14 Carcinogens Standard
In an early case challenging OSHA’s authority to
regulate 14 carcinogens, the District of Columbia
Circuit Court of Appeals first addressed the issue
of substantial evidence. For 8 of the 14 carcino-
gens, there were no human (epidemiologic) data.
Industry challenged OSHA’s ability to impose con-
trols on employers in the absence of human data.
Here the court expressed its view that some facts,
such as the establishment of human carcinogenic
risk from animal data, were on the “frontiers of
scientific knowledge” and that the requirement for
standards to be supported by substantial evidence
in these kinds of social policy decisions could not
be subjected to the rigors of other kinds of factual
determinations. Thus, OSHA was permitted to re-
quire protective action against substances known to
produce cancer in animals but with no evidence of
producing cancer in humans. It was not until 1980
that the U.S. Supreme Court in the benzene case
(see later) placed limits on the extent of OSHA’s
policy determination on carcinogenic risk.
The Asbestos Standard
In the challenge to OSHA’s original asbestos
standard, in which asbestos was regulated as a
classic lung toxin and not as a carcinogen, the In-
dustrial Union Department of the American Fed-
eration of Labor and Congress of Industrial Or-
ganizations (AFL-CIO) unsuccessfully challenged
the laxity of the standard, claiming that OSHA im-
properly weighed economic considerations in its
determination of feasibility. OSHA indeed was per-
mitted to consider economic factors in establishing
feasibility. The District of Columbia Circuit Court
of Appeals went on to state, however, that a stan-
dard might be feasible even if some employers were
forced out of business, as long as the entire asbestos-
using industry was not disrupted. In 1986, OSHA
revised the standard from 2.0 to 0.2 fibers/cm3, thus
finally acknowledging asbestos as a carcinogen.
The Vinyl Chloride Standard
In the industry challenge to OSHA’s regulation of
vinyl chloride at 1 ppm, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals reiterated OSHA’s ability to make policy
judgments with regard to matters “on the frontiers
of scientific knowledge” when it declared that there
could be no safe level for a carcinogen. In addi-
tion, the court said that because 1 ppm was the low-
est feasible (here meaning, lowest detectable) level,
OSHA was permitted to force employers to comply
even though it had performed no formal risk assess-
ment or knew how many tumors would be prevented
by the adoption of this protective level. Another
noteworthy aspect of the case was the recognition
that OSHA could act as a technology forcer and re-
quire controls not yet fully developed at the time of
the setting of the standard.
The Lead Standard
Protection from lead exposure had been provided
through the TLV of 200 µg/m3. This level was long
recognized as inadequate for workers who accu-
mulated lead in their body tissues and for women
(and possibly men) who intended to have chil-
dren. As a result, based on the limits of technolog-
ical feasibility, OSHA promulgated a new standard
that permitted no exposure greater than 50 µg/m3
averaged over an 8-hour period. In addition, be-
cause this was still unsafe for many workers, OSHA
also provided that workers be removed with pay
and employment security if their blood lead lev-
els (BLLs) exceeded 50 µg/dL or if there were
grounds to remove them based on risks to their
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reproductive system. The legality and necessity of
this additional provision, known as Medical Re-
moval Protection (MRP), was unsuccessfully chal-
lenged by the Lead Industries Association. OSHA
specifically provided that workers in workplaces
with air lead levels over an “action level” of
30 µg/m3 have the benefit of a continuing medi-
cal surveillance program, including periodic sam-
pling of BLLs and removal from exposure above
the action level after finding a BLL in an individual
worker above 50 µg/dL, with job return when the
worker’s BLL fell below 40 µg/dL.
Removal could also be triggered by other medi-
cal conditions deemed especially sensitive to risks
associated with lead exposure, such as pregnancy.
OSHA provided that workers’ pay and seniority be
maintained by the employer during any periods of
medical removal (up to 18 months), even if such re-
moval entailed sending the worker home. In actual
practice, many employers have reduced the ambient
air lead level well below 50 µg/m3, which results in
the removal of fewer workers. (In the 1980s, MRP
was required in a limited way in the cotton dust
and benzene standards. In 1998, medical removal
requirements were added to the methylene chloride
standard.)
The Benzene Standard
After the first serious successful industry challenge
of an OSHA benzene standard in the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals, the U.S. Supreme Court, in a
controversial and divided majority opinion, chided
OSHA for not attempting to evaluate the benefits
of changing the PEL for benzene from 10 ppm
(the former TLV) to 1 ppm. The Court argued that
OSHA is obligated to regulate only “significant
risks” and that without a risk assessment of some
kind, OSHA could not know whether the proposed
control addressed a significant risk. The Court
was careful to state that it was not attempting to
“statistically straitjacket” the agency, but that at a
minimum the benefits of regulation needed to be
addressed to meet the substantial evidence test.
The Court did not give useful guidance concerning
what constituted a significant risk. It stated that a
risk of death of 1 in 1,000 was clearly significant,
whereas a risk of 1 in 1 billion was clearly not
so. This six-orders-of-magnitude range, of course,
represents the area on which the political arguments
have always been centered. The implications of the
benzene decision for subsequent standards would
come to reflect the political and philosophical
leanings of future OSHA administrations. Unfor-
tunately, worker protection has since gravitated to
the largest permissible exposure, approximating 1
in 1,000 lifetime risk of cancer, to be contrasted
with some public health protections under the
Clean Air Act of 1 in 1,000,000.
There is little question that had OSHA sub-
mitted a risk assessment for benzene at the time,
it could have argued that the risk it was attempting
to address was actually significant. The precise re-
quirement and nature of a risk assessment sufficient
to meet the substantial evidence test remains un-
clear. In late 1985, OSHA again proposed to lower
the PEL from 10 to 1 ppm, and, in 1987, the standard
was set at that level. OSHA, however, after inter-
vention by the Office of Management and Budget,
declined to establish a short-term exposure limit.
The petroleum industry argued in the benzene
case that not only must a risk assessment be
performed, but a cost–benefit analysis must be
done in which the risks of exposure are balanced
against the benefits of the chemical. The ques-
tion, however, was not decided in the benzene
case but was addressed in a later case challenging
OSHA’s cotton dust standard. The Supreme Court
not only acknowledged that cotton dust did
represent a significant risk but also indicated that
a cost–benefit balancing was neither required nor
permitted by the OSHAct because Congress had al-
ready struck the balance heavily in favor of worker
health and safety.
The Generic Carcinogen Standard
In 1980, OSHA promulgated a generic carcinogen
standard by which questions of science policy, al-
ready settled as law in cases dealing with other
standards, were codified in a set of principles. Dur-
ing the process of developing the generic carcino-
gen standard, OSHA and NIOSH developed lists of
chemical substances that would probably be clas-
sified as suspect carcinogens. Each agency com-
posed a list of approximately 250 substances. Af-
ter revising the generic standard to reflect the need
to determine if a particular carcinogenic risk was
significant—as required by the U.S. Supreme Court
in the benzene decision—OSHA declined to for-
mally list any substance under the carcinogen stan-
dard. In setting or revising standards for formalde-
hyde, ethylene oxide, asbestos, and benzene, OSHA
has proceeded to act as if the generic carcinogen
standard did not exist, thus following the histori-
cally arduous and slow path to standard-setting.
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Emergency Temporary Standards
In Section 6(c), the OSHAct authorizes OSHA to
set, on publication in the Federal Register and with-
out recourse to a formal hearing; emergency tem-
porary (6-month) standards (ETSs) for toxic expo-
sures constituting a “grave danger.” Before OSHA
lowered its permanent standard for asbestos from
2.0 to 0.2 fibers/cm3, it attempted to protect workers
by promulgating an ETS at 0.5 fibers/cm3. In 1984,
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals denied OSHA
the ETS, arguing that the cost involved defeated the
requirement that the ETS be “necessary” to protect
workers. Attempts by OSHA to establish an ETS for
hexavalent chromium likewise failed court review.
OSHA has issued nine emergency temporary
standards under the OSHAct. Standards for vinyl
chloride, dibromo-3-chloropropane (DBCP), and
the first ETS on asbestos were not challenged in
court and remained in effect until superseded by
permanent standards. An ETS for acrylonitrile sur-
vived court challenge. ETSs on benzene, commer-
cial diving, pesticides, 14 carcinogens, and asbestos
were stayed or vacated by the courts.
Over the past decade, OSHA has avoided set-
ting ETSs and instead has proceeded directly—
but slowly—to establishing permanent standards
for toxic substances under Section 6(b)(5). Thus,
OSHA denied a 1993 request from Public Citizen
for a temporary emergency hexavalent chromium
standard but promised an advanced notice of rule
making for 1995. After a successful court challenge,
in October 2004, 9 years after OSHA’s promised
action, it finally issued a proposed revision of its
8-hour exposure limit, lowering the standard to
1 µg/m3 from the previous 33-year-old standard
of 52 µg/m3, thus preventing 350 excess cancers
annually. A 2001 petition requesting an ETS for
beryllium was unsuccessful. However, OSHA is
currently planning for a permanent standard.
Short-Term Exposure Limits
Short-term exposures to higher levels of carcino-
gens are in general considered more hazardous
than longer exposures to lower levels. OSHA is-
sued a new standard for exposure to ethylene oxide
in 1984 but excluded a short-term exposure limit
(STEL) that had originally been prepared, in defer-
ence to objections from the Office of Management
and Budget. Ralph Nader’s Health Research Group
sued the Secretary of Labor in 1986 over OSHA’s
continuing failure to issue the STEL. In 1987, the
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals or-
dered OSHA to establish a STEL for ethylene oxide
by March 1988. OSHA complied by setting a STEL
of 5 ppm over a 15-minute period.
The Air Contaminants Standard
It is obvious that the slow, arduous process of pro-
mulgating individual health standards under Sec-
tion 6(b)(5) of the OSHAct could never catch up
with advances in scientific knowledge concerning
the toxicity of chemicals. The ACGIH has updated
its TLV list every 2 years, and although not as
protective as workers and their unions would have
liked, the recent updated lists did advance protec-
tion over the 1969 list that OSHA adopted into
law in 1971. In 1989, OSHA decided to update the
original list in a single rule-making effort through
the 6(b) standard revision route. The agency issued
more protective limits for 212 substances and estab-
lished limits for 164 chemicals that were previously
unregulated. Neither industry nor labor was satis-
fied with the standards. Industry, although giving
general support, objected to the stringency of some
of the PELs. Labor objected to their laxity, citing
NIOSH recommendations not adopted, and gener-
ally objected to the rush-it-through process.
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals vacated
the standard in 1992, ruling that OSHA failed to es-
tablish that a significant risk of material health im-
pairment existed for each regulated substance (re-
quired by the benzene decision) and that the new
exposure limit for each substance was feasible for
the affected industry. OSHA decided not to appeal
the decision to what it perceived as a conservative
Supreme Court. Thus, the original and inadequate
TLV list remains in effect, and 164 new substances
remain unregulated. OSHA periodically expresses
its intent on updating the list through new rule mak-
ing, but no new action has been forthcoming.
In the meantime, OSHA could argue that those
164 substances are “recognized hazards” and en-
forceable through OSHA’s general duty clause, but
OSHA administrations have not been willing to em-
phasize this approach in the case of the TLVs, al-
though OSHA has used the general duty obligation
to force compliance with good ergonomic practices
in nursing homes. In 20 years, OSHA has issued
only about a dozen general duty citations for sub-
stances covered by the original TLV list. Recently,
OSHA’s reluctance to use the general duty obliga-
tion in the case of the outdated TLVs was in part
due to the many congressional attempts to pass leg-
islation prohibiting such use.
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The Toxic Substances Control Act
TSCA enables EPA to require data from industry on
the production, use, and health and environmental
effects of chemicals. TSCA also requires the manu-
facturer of new chemicals, or of existing chemicals
put to a significant new use, to file a premarket no-
tification with EPA. EPA may regulate chemicals
under TSCA—by requiring labeling, setting toler-
ances, or banning completely and requiring repur-
chase or recall—where the chemicals present “an
unreasonable risk of injury to human health or the
environment.” EPA may also order a specific change
in chemical process technology. In addition, TSCA
gives aggrieved parties, including consumers and
workers, specific rights to sue to enforce under the
act, with the possibility of awards for attorneys’
fees. (This feature was missing in the OSHAct.)
Under TSCA, EPA must regulate “unreason-
able risks of injury to human health or the envi-
ronment.” EPA has issued a regulation for worker
protection from asbestos at the new OSHA limit
of 0.2 fibers/cm3, which applies to state and local
government asbestos abatement workers not cov-
ered by OSHA. Although the potential for regu-
lating workplace chemicals is there, EPA has not
been aggressive in this area. Between 1977 and
1990, of the 22 regulatory actions taken on existing
chemicals, 15 addressed polychlorinated biphenyls
(PCBs), which EPA has a specific statutory directive
to address under TSCA. Only regulations pertain-
ing to asbestos, hexavalent chromium, and metal-
working fluids had a strong occupational expo-
sure component. Although EPA declared formalde-
hyde a “probable carcinogen” and the International
Agency for Research on Cancer classified it as a
confirmed human carcinogen, EPA chose not to take
regulatory action on this substance, opting instead
to defer to OSHA workplace regulations.
Used together, the OSHAct and TSCA pro-
vide potentially comprehensive and effective
information-generation and standard-setting au-
thority to protect workers. In particular, the
information-generation activities under TSCA can
provide the necessary data to have a substance qual-
ify as a recognized hazard that, even in the absence
of specific OSHA standards, must be controlled in
some way by the employer to meet the general duty
obligation under the OSHAct to provide a safe and
healthful workplace.
The potentially powerful role of TSCA regula-
tion was seriously challenged by the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals in 1991, when it overturned the
omnibus asbestos phase-out rule that EPA had is-
sued in 1989. The court held that, under TSCA,
EPA should not have issued a ban without having
first considered alternatives that would have been
less burdensome to industry. This would require
the agency to perform a more comprehensive, de-
tailed, and resource-intensive analysis. Rightly or
wrongly, EPA has viewed this case (which was not
appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court) as a significant
impediment to future TSCA regulations, and the
agency generally regards regulation of chemicals
other than PCBs under TSCA to be a dead letter for
now. With an unsympathetic Congress, there are no
successful attempts to resurrect the regulatory au-
thority of TSCA. However, TSCA continues to be
important for its surviving authority to require the
testing of chemicals and for its information report-
ing and retaining requirements (see the discussion
later in this chapter on the right to know).
Control of Gradual Pollution in Air,
Water, and Waste
The Clean Air Act
The modern Clean Air Act (CAA) came into be-
ing in 1970, and although significant changes were
made in 1977 and 1990, the basic structure of the
act has remained the same, with the addition of pro-
visions for authority over acid rain, chlorofluoro-
carbons (CFCs), indoor air, and chemical safety.
(The last of these is discussed later in this chap-
ter.) The CAA regulates both stationary and mo-
bile sources of pollution, taking into account the
relative contributions of each to specific air pol-
lution problems—and the relative capacity of dif-
ferent kinds of sources within each category to re-
duce their emissions. The recognition that sources
using newer technology might be able to achieve
greater emission reductions than older sources with
older technology led to the act’s distinction—both
in the stationary and mobile source provisions—
between new and existing sources. Although driven
by equity considerations regarding the relative fi-
nancial and technical burdens of pollution reduc-
tion, however, this approach unwittingly discour-
aged modernization or replacement of facilities and
resulted in the operation of older (especially en-
ergy) facilities beyond their expected useful life.
For new sources within each industrial sector,
there was a recognition of the need for uniformity
and also for encouraging technological innovation
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through technology-forcing inherent in stringent
standards.∗ (See Chapter 17.)
The 1970 CAA directed EPA to establish pri-
mary ambient air quality standards that would
protect public health with “an adequate margin
of safety.” [see §109(b)(1)] As interpreted by the
courts and supported by congressional history,
these standards were to be established without
consideration of economic or technological feasi-
bility. In addition, secondary ambient air quality
standards were to be established to protect “the
public welfare”. . .“within a reasonable time” [see
§109(b)(2)].
Both federal and state government were to be
involved in protecting the ambient air. Ambient air
quality (concentration) standards were to be estab-
lished by the federal government, and these were to
be attained through (a) emission limitations placed
on individual existing polluters through permits is-
sued by state government as a part of their State
Implementation Plans (SIPs) [§110]; (b) emission
limitations for new sources, established not by the
states but rather by EPA as New Source Performance
Standards [§111]; and (c) by a combination of fed-
eral and state restrictions on mobile sources. In
specifying compliance with federal emission stan-
dards, Congress expressed concern with possible
hot spots of localized intense pollution and also with
intermittent versus continuous versus sudden and
accidental releases of harmful substances. Emis-
sion standards, in contrast with ambient concentra-
tion standards, are expressed as an emissions rate
(mg emitted per 100 kg of product, per hour, per
day, per week, per quarter, per year, per BTU, per
passenger mile, or other unit of measurement).
The 1970 CAA also made a distinction between
the federal control of criteria pollutants through am-
bient air standards and the control of hazardous
air pollutants by means of federal emission lim-
itations. Hazardous air pollutants were those rec-
ognized as extraordinarily toxic and eventually re-
garded as non- or low-threshold pollutants. Initially,
these were to be regulated to protect public health
with “an ample margin of safety” [§112] and, as
with the standards for primary ambient air pollu-
tants, standards were to be established without con-
sideration of economic burden. These pollutants,
Congress determined, were sufficiently dangerous
∗
The court decisions recognizing EPA’s technology-forcing
authority were greatly influenced by OSHA’s early
technology-forcing approach to worker protection.
to preclude any reliance on atmospheric dispersion
and mixing as a means of reducing their ambient
concentrations. Because of their extraordinary tox-
icity, hot spots were to be avoided, and because
ambient concentration air quality standards were
considered impractical and of little relevance for
sporadic and idiosyncratic sources, uniform fed-
eral emission standards were considered necessary.
(Note, however, that California did establish an am-
bient standard complement to the federal emission
limitation on vinyl chloride.)
In the early stages of the implementation of
the stationary source provisions of the Clean Air
Act (approximately 1970–1975), EPA focused on
(a) the primary and secondary ambient air quality
standards and (b) emission standards for both new
sources of criteria pollutants and for all sources
emitting seven regulated hazardous air pollutants
(discussed below). Prior advisory standards for car-
bon monoxide (CO), sulfur dioxide (SO2), oxides of
nitrogen (NOX), large particulate matter, and photo-
chemical oxidants were made mandatory. In Febru-
ary 1979, the standard for photochemical oxidants
was narrowed to cover only ground-level ozone, and
the standard was relaxed from 0.08 ppm to 0.12 ppm
averaged over a 1-hour period. The standard for par-
ticulate matter (PM10)—“inhalable” particulates up
to 10 µm in diameter—was adopted in 1987. In
July 1997, the ozone standard was further revised to
0.08 ppm. At the same time, the particulate standard
was altered to place more stringent requirements on
smaller (<2.5 µm) “respirable” particles (PM2.5).
A standard for a new criteria pollutant—airborne
lead—was promulgated in October 1978. Current
primary air quality standards set under Section 109
are found in Table 3-1.
In Section 112, Congress directed the admin-
istrator to set emission standards for hazardous
air pollutants at a level that protects public health
“with an ample margin of safety.” It is likely that
this phraseology reflected an early assumption that,
though very dangerous, hazardous pollutants did
exhibit a finite threshold (a nonzero level of expo-
sure below which no harm would occur). As the
1970s progressed, however, there was a growing
recognition that this assumption might be wrong,
and that for many hazardous pollutants there was
no level of exposure (at least at levels within the
limits of detection) below which one could confi-
dently predict that no harmful or irreversible ef-
fects (especially cancer or birth defects) would
occur.
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ˆˆ ˆˆ
T A B L E 3 - 1
National Ambient Air Quality Standards
Carbon monoxide Primary: 35 ppm averaged over 1 hour and 9.0 averaged over 8 hours; neither to be exceeded
more than once per year.
Secondary: none.
Particulate matter: (Note that PMxy below refers to particles equal to or less than xy µm in diameter.)
PM10 Primary: 150 µg/m3 averaged over 24 hours, with no more than one expected exceedance
per calendar year; also, 50 µg/m3 or less for the expected annual arithmetic mean concentration.
Secondary: same as primary.
PM2.5 Additional primary: 65 µg/m3 averaged over 24 hours; 15 µg/m3 annual maximum.
Ozone Prior primary: 235 µg/m3 (0.12 ppm) averaged over 1 hour, no more than one expected
exceedance per calendar year (multiple violations in a day count as one violation).
Prior secondary: same as primary.
Revised (current) primary: 0.08 ppm averaged over 8 hours.
Nitrogen dioxide Primary: 100 µg/m3 (0.053 ppm) as an annual arithmetic mean concentration.
Secondary: same as primary.
Sulfur oxides Primary: 365 µg/m3 (0.14 ppm) averaged over 24 hours, not to be exceeded more than.
once per year; 80 µg/m3 (0.03 ppm) annual arithmetic mean.
Secondary: 1,300 µg/m3 averaged over a 3-hour period, not to be exceeded morethan
once per year.
Lead Primary: 1.5 µg/m3 arithmetic average over a calendar quarter.
Secondary: same as primary.
This presented an implementation challenge for
EPA. Arguably, given its mandate to protect pub-
lic health “with an ample margin of safety,” the
agency was required to ban the emission of several
hazardous substances. This would, as a practical
matter, essentially ban the use of these substances
in many industries. Seeking to avoid this result,
EPA adopted a policy of setting Section 112 emis-
sion standards at the level that could be achieved
by technologically feasible technology.∗ Using this
approach, EPA set finite (nonzero) standards for
arsenic, asbestos, benzene, beryllium, coke oven
emissions, mercury, vinyl chloride, and radionu-
clides. The standard-setting process was slow and
had to be forced by litigation; it took 4 to 7 years
to establish a final standard for each of these sub-
stances. Had EPA continued to set standards for
∗
This is the approach then followed by OSHA in setting
standards for exposure to workplace chemicals. In the
case of carcinogens, OSHA considered no levels to be
safe and established control requirements at the limit of
technological feasibility.
more substances, and had it used the technolog-
ical feasibility approach to spur the development
of cleaner technology, the environmental groups
may well have been content to allow the imple-
mentation of Section 112 to proceed in this fashion.
When the setting of new Section 112 standards all
but stalled during the Reagan administration, how-
ever, the NRDC was determined to press the issue
in court.
NRDC v. EPA, decided by the District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, placed new
limitations on EPA’s approach to regulating haz-
ardous air pollutants by requiring the EPA to de-
termine an “acceptable” (nonzero) risk level prior
to setting a hazardous air pollutant standard. In
reaction to this case and to revitalize the mori-
bund standard-setting process, Congress amended
Section 112 in 1990 to use a two-tiered approach:
the use of technology-based standards initially, with
residual risks to be addressed (at a later date) by
health-based standards. In the 1990 CAA amend-
ments, Congress listed 189 other substances for
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which Maximum Achievable Control Technology
(MACT) technology-based standards were to be set
over 10 years for major sources (defined as those
emitting more than 10 tons per year of any sin-
gle toxin or more than 25 tons combined). EPA
was further mandated to issue a new rule, “where
appropriate,” adding pollutants “which present or
may present . . . a threat of adverse human effects
(including, but not limited to, substances which are
known to be or may be reasonably anticipated to be,
carcinogenic, mutagenic, teratogenic, neurotoxic,
which cause reproductive dysfunction, or which
are acutely or chronically toxic) or adverse envi-
ronmental effects whether through ambient con-
centration, bioaccumulation, deposition or other-
wise.” In addition, for nonmajor (that is, so-called
area) sources, restrictions may be less—Generally
Achievable Control Technology (GACT) or man-
agement practices. More stringent requirements are
allowed for all new sources. Emission standards
established under MACT must require “the max-
imum degree of reduction (including a prohibition
on emissions, where achievable)” but must reflect
“the cost of achieving emissions reduction and any
non-air and environmental impact and energy re-
quirements.” For pollutants with a health thresh-
old, EPA could alternatively consider regulating an
ample margin of safety in establishing emission
levels—essentially the original mandate of the 1970
CAA. Finally, EPA was obligated to issue a report
on risk, which it did in 2004. If no new legisla-
tion recommended by that report is enacted within
8 years, EPA must issue such additional reg-
ulations as are necessary to protect public
health with an ample margin of safety—in
general—and, specifically for carcinogens, pro-
tect against lifetime risks of one-in-a-million or
more. EPA did make substantial progress on es-
tablishing MACT and GACT standards but has
just begun working on risk- or health-based
approaches.
Water Legislation
The two most important federal statutes regulating
water pollution are the Clean Water Act (CWA) and
the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA). The CWA
regulates the discharge of pollutants into naviga-
ble surface waters (and into smaller waterways and
wetlands that are hydrologically connected to navi-
gable waters), and the SDWA regulates the level
of contaminants in public drinking-water supplies.
(See Chapter 19.)
The Clean Water Act
The modern Clean Water act has its origins in the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments
of 1972. The basic structure of the act was estab-
lished at that time, although it was refined and refo-
cused by the Clean Water Act Amendments of 1977
(from which it also took its name) and by the Water
Quality Act Amendments of 1987. The regulatory
focus of the CWA is the discharge of pollutants to
surface waters from “point sources,” principally in-
dustrial facilities and municipal sewage treatment
plants (known under the act as publicly owned treat-
ment works, or POTWs). The CWA flatly prohibits
any discharge of a pollutant from a point source
to surface waters unless it is done in conformance
with the requirements of the act, and the statute has
since 1972 retained as an explicit “national goal” the
elimination of all point—source discharges to sur-
face waters by 1985. Although the “no discharge”
goal may never be attainable in practical terms,
it has helped focus the act’s implementation on
gradual—but inexorable—pollution reduction, as
discharge limits are made more stringent over time.
The centerpiece of this pollution reduction
scheme is the National Pollutant Discharge Elimi-
nation System (NPDES) permit. In theory, all point
sources must have an NPDES permit before dis-
charging pollutants to surface waters. In practice,
however, many dischargers (mostly smaller ones)
still do not. The NPDES permit, which is issued af-
ter public notice and an opportunity for comment,
is to incorporate all of the various requirements of
the act—including discharge limits—that are appli-
cable to the point source in question. Point sources
are subjected both to technology-based and water
quality-based limits and to the more stringent of the
two when they overlap.
The technology-based limits are established by
EPA as national standards. To set these standards
for industrial dischargers, EPA first divided indus-
try into various industry categories and then es-
tablished effluent limits for each category based
on its assessment of what was technologically and
economically feasible for the point sources within
that category. Further, as required by the act, EPA
set different standards within each industrial cate-
gory for conventional pollutants (biochemical oxy-
gen demand, fecal coliform, oil and grease, pH, and
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total suspended solids), toxic pollutants (currently
a list of 129 designated chemical compounds),
and nonconventional pollutants (which simply are
other pollutants, such as total phenols, which are
listed neither under the conventional nor the toxic
designation).
In recognition of the fact that conventional pollu-
tants usually are amenable to treatment by the types
of pollution control equipment that has long been
in use at conventional sewage treatment facilities,
the standards for conventional pollutants are set ac-
cording to what can be obtained through the use of
the Best Conventional Pollution Control Technol-
ogy (BCT), taking into account the reasonableness
of the cost. The standards for toxic and nonconven-
tional pollutants, on the other hand, are set accord-
ing to EPA’s determination of the level of pollution
reduction that can be achieved through the appli-
cation of the Best Available Technology Economi-
cally Achievable (BAT). Originally, Congress had
directed EPA to set health-based standards for toxic
pollutants, on a pollutant-by-pollutant basis, but
this resulted in only a handful of standards (mostly
for pesticide chemicals). The political difficulty
of establishing national health-based standards for
toxic chemicals led environmental groups, in a suit
against EPA to compel regulation, to agree to a
schedule for setting technology-based standards for
a list of designated toxic pollutants. Congress for-
mally endorsed this approach in 1977 by amending
the act to require EPA to set BAT standards for all
of the toxic pollutants on that list.
Under the CWA, EPA is to consider both control
and process technology in setting BAT standards,
which are to “result in reasonable further progress
toward the national goal of eliminating the dis-
charge of all pollutants” and are to require “the elim-
ination of discharges of all pollutants [where] such
elimination is technologically and economically
achievable.” An individual discharger may obtain
a cost waiver from BAT standards for nonconven-
tional pollutants if it cannot afford to comply, but no
cost waiver is available from the standards for toxic
pollutants. For new industrial sources within an in-
dustry category, EPA is to set standards based on
Best Available Demonstrated Technology (BADT),
which can be more stringent than BAT or BCT be-
cause of the greater technological flexibility inher-
ent in the design and construction of a new facility.
Although industry-wide costs are to be considered
by EPA in establishing BADT standards, no waivers
are available to individual applicants once the stan-
dards are set.
The CWA also imposes technology-based stan-
dards on POTWs, based on the limitations that
can be met through the application of secondary
sewage treatment technology. In essence, this re-
quires an 85 percent reduction in biochemical oxy-
gen demand and total suspended solids. In addi-
tion, the act imposes limitations on discharges by
industrial sources into POTWs. Such discharges are
known under the act as “indirect” discharges (be-
cause the pollutants are not discharged directly to
surface waters but rather are discharged indirectly
to surface waters through a public sewer system).
Limitations on indirect discharges are known under
the act as “pretreatment” standards, because they
have the effect of requiring the indirect discharger
to treat its wastewater before discharging it to the
POTW for further treatment. EPA has set national
technology-based limitations (known as the “cat-
egorical” pretreatment standards) on indirect dis-
charges of toxic pollutants by firms in certain in-
dustrial categories. In addition, the act requires the
POTW to set such additional pretreatment limits
and requirements as is necessary both to ensure the
integrity of the sewage treatment process and to
prevent the indirectly discharged pollutants from
“passing through” the sewer system and causing a
violation of the POTW’s discharge permit.
For the first 15 to 20 years of the act’s imple-
mentation, the primary focus was the establishment
and implementation of the technology-based limits
discussed above. More recently, however, consider-
ably more attention has been given to the act’s sys-
tem of water quality–based limits, which is equally
applicable to industrial sources and POTWs. Since
1972, the CWA has directed the states to establish,
and periodically revise, ambient (in-stream) water
quality standards for all of the lakes, rivers, streams,
bays, and other waterways within their borders and
has required EPA to set and revise these standards to
the extent that a state declines to do so. Further, the
act has required since 1977 that NPDES permits in-
clude such additional discharge limits—beyond the
national technology-based limits—as may be nec-
essary to meet the ambient water quality standards
of the waterway in question.
To help call attention to these water quality re-
quirements, Congress in 1987 added what became
known as the “toxic hot spot” provision of the
CWA, which directed EPA and the states to identify
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those waters that were in violation of ambient water
quality standards because of toxic pollution, to
identify those point sources whose discharges
of toxic pollutants were contributing to those
violations, and to develop an “individual control
strategy” for that source (which almost always
meant a revision of the source’s NPDES permit to
add or tighten limits on toxic pollutants). Another
provision of the act that has prompted the addition
or tightening of water quality–based discharge
limits has been the requirement that the states
(and, if they decline, the EPA) to calculate a total
maximum daily load (TMDL) for all waters that are
in violation of ambient water quality standards. For
any particular body or water, the TMDL for a par-
ticular pollutant is the total amount of that pollutant
that may be discharged to the water body in a day
without violating the relevant ambient water qual-
ity standard. When a TMDL is set, it often leads
inexorably to a tightening of the NPDES permits
of those point sources whose discharges are con-
tributing to the particular violation of water quality
standards. Although the TMDL requirement has
been in the act since 1972, the states and EPA have
been slow to implement it. Over the past 10 years
or so, however, as a result of several successful
suits by environmental groups seeking to compel
EPA to set TMDLs in the face of state inaction,
the TMDL requirement has come considerably
more to the fore. Consequently, the inclusion of
water quality–based limits in NPDES permits has
become considerably more commonplace.
The Safe Drinking Water Act
Although some sources of drinking water are also
regulated as surface waters under the CWA, the leg-
islation specifically designed to protect the safety
of the drinking water delivered to the public from
public water systems is the SDWA. Passed in 1974
after a series of well-publicized stories about the
number of potential carcinogens in the Mississippi
River water used as drinking water by the City
of New Orleans, it contains very little that is de-
signed to address the sources of drinking water
pollution. Instead, the SDWA directs EPA to set
national health-based goals—known as maximum
contaminant level goals (MCL goals)—for vari-
ous drinking water contaminants and to set max-
imum contaminant levels (MCLs) that are as close
to the MCL goals as is technologically and econom-
ically feasible. All public water systems, defined as
those with at least 15 service connections or that
serve at least 25 people, are required to meet the
MCLs.
Over the act’s first 8 years, EPA set only 23 fed-
eral drinking water standards. Dissatisfied with the
pace of implementation, Congress amended the act
in 1986 to spur the agency into action. It directed
EPA to set standards (MCLs and MCL goals) for
83 specified contaminants within 3 years and to
set standards for 25 additional contaminants every
3 years thereafter. Ten years later, with scores of
MCLs and MCL goals now on the books, Congress
scaled back. In a 1996 compromise endorsed by
environmental groups and water suppliers alike,
Congress eliminated the requirement for 25 new
standards every 3 years. At the same time, it added
provisions that effectively ensured both that the
standards that had been set would largely be allowed
to remain in place and that new standards would be
far slower in coming (and likely would be—because
of the addition of a cost–benefit requirement—
relatively weaker).
Since then, the primary focus of the SDWA
program has been bringing public water systems
throughout the country into compliance with the
existing standards. Although the MCLs are set at
a level deemed to be technologically and econom-
ically feasible, many water systems have had diffi-
culty affording the cost of meeting, and monitoring
for, the MCLs. To attempt to ameliorate the finan-
cial burden on municipal water systems, the SDWA
has periodically made federal funds available for
technology upgrades and infrastructure improve-
ments. The task, however, remains a daunting one.
In 2002, EPA estimated that approximately $151
billion would be needed over the next 20 years
to upgrade the nation’s 55,000 community water
systems.
The Regulation of Hazardous Waste
Broadly speaking, the generation, handling, and
disposal of hazardous wastes are regulated by the
interaction of two federal statutes. The primary fed-
eral law regulating hazardous wastes is officially
known as the Solid Waste Disposal Act. In 1970,
Congress amended that statute with the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), and the
law has come to be popularly known by that name.
RCRA was given regulatory “teeth” with a set
of 1976 amendments under which EPA, in 1980,
promulgated regulations establishing a “cradle-to-
grave” system for hazardous wastes that tracks
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the generation, transportation, and disposal of such
wastes and establishes standards for their disposal.
Initially, however, EPA’s disposal standards were
minimal to nonexistent and did little to discour-
age the landfilling of chemical wastes. This led
Congress, in 1984, to pass sweeping amendments
to RCRA that (1) established a clear federal policy
against the landfilling of hazardous wastes unless
they have first been treated to reduce their toxicity
and (2) gave EPA a specific timetable by which
it had to either set treatment standards for vari-
ous categories of waste or ban the landfilling of
such waste altogether. Consequently, EPA has set
treatment standards—which are commonly known
as the land disposal restrictions (LDRs)—for hun-
dreds of types of hazardous wastes. These standards
are based on EPA’s assessment of the Best Demon-
strated Available Technology for treating the waste
in question.
Thus, RCRA directly regulates the handling and
disposal of hazardous wastes. And by establishing
a set of requirements that must be followed once
hazardous waste is generated, it also indirectly reg-
ulates the generation of hazardous wastes. RCRA
regulations have increased the cost of disposing of
most types of waste by two orders of magnitude
over the past 25 years. In this sense, RCRA oper-
ates as a de facto tax on the generation of hazardous
waste. (See Chapter 20.)
Another statute that acts as an indirect check
on hazardous waste generation (and that provides
additional incentive to ensure that one’s waste is
safely disposed) is the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA, also known as the federal Superfund
law). The primary focus of this law is the reme-
diation (cleanup) of hazardous waste contamina-
tion resulting from imprudent handling and disposal
practices of the past and the recovery of remedia-
tion costs from those designated as “responsible
parties” under the act. CERCLA imposes liability
for the costs of remediating a hazardous waste site
both on the owners and operators of the site and on
those generators of hazardous waste that sent waste
to the site. Because the owners and operators are
often business entities that are no longer financially
viable, CERCLA liability often falls most heavily
on the generators. And CERCLA liability is strict
liability, meaning that the exercise of reasonable
care by the generator is not a defense. Further, un-
less the generator can establish a convincing factual
basis for distinguishing its waste from all or part
of the contamination being remediated, CERCLA
liability is joint and several, meaning that each re-
sponsible party is potentially liable for the full cost
of remediation. As a practical matter, this means
that the cost of remediation will be borne by those
among the responsible parties who are financially
solvent.
The prudent business entity, then, has a strong
financial incentive to take such actions as will min-
imize the likelihood that it will face CERCLA lia-
bility in the future. As the only certain way to avoid
such liability is to refrain from generating the waste
in the first instance, CERCLA does provide a ratio-
nale for pollution prevention. Further, it provides
firms with an incentive to meet—or perhaps to go
beyond—RCRA regulations in dealing with such
wastes as they do generate.
This is not to say, of course, that substantial
amounts of hazardous waste are no longer generated
in the United States, that all hazardous wastes are
adequately treated and safely disposed, or that all in-
stances of hazardous waste contamination are being
adequately addressed (or addressed at all). RCRA
and CERCLA both contain what might reasonably
be called loopholes and gaps in coverage, and haz-
ardous waste contamination remains an ongoing is-
sue. Further, the most common treatment methodol-
ogy incorporated into EPA’s RCRA treatment stan-
dards is incineration, which has brought with it a
release of airborne contaminants that has yet to be
comprehensively addressed by regulation. There is
no question, however, that the country has made
considerable progress from the late 1970s, when
disposal of chemical wastes in unlined landfills—
at a cost of roughly $15 per ton—was the common
practice.
The Chemical Safety Provisions of
the Clean Air Act: Obligations
Shared by EPA and OSHA
Although the first congressional response to the
country’s concern generated by the deadly indus-
trial accident in Bhopal, India, was the Emergency
Planning and Community Right to Know Act of
1986, the chemical safety provisions of that law are
focused almost solely on mitigation and not on ac-
cident prevention. A much greater potential for a
direct focus on accident prevention can be found
in the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act, al-
though that potential has yet to be realized by EPA
and OSHA.
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As amended in 1990, Section 112 of the Clean
Air Act directs the EPA to develop regulations
regarding the prevention and detection of acciden-
tal chemical releases and to publish a list of at least
100 chemical substances (with associated thresh-
old quantities) to be covered by the regulations.
The regulations must include requirements for the
development of risk-management plans (RMPs)
by facilities using any of the regulated substances
in amounts above the relevant threshold. These
RMPs must include a hazard assessment, an acci-
dent prevention program, and an emergency release
program. Similarly, Section 304 of the Clean Air
Amendments of 1990 directed OSHA to promul-
gate a Process Safety Management (PSM) standard
under the OSHAct.
Section 112(r) of the revised Clean Air Act also
imposes a “general duty” on all “owners and oper-
ators of stationary sources,” regardless of the par-
ticular identity or quantity of the chemicals used on
site. These parties have a duty to:
“. . . identify hazards that may result from
[accidental chemical] releases using appropriate
hazard assessment techniques,
. . . design and maintain a safe facility taking
such steps as are necessary to prevent releases,
and
. . . minimize the consequences of accidental
releases which do occur.” [emphases added]
Thus, firms are now under a general duty to antic-
ipate, prevent, and mitigate accidental releases. In
defining the nature of this duty, Section 112(r) spec-
ifies that it is “a general duty in the same manner
and to the same extent as” that imposed by Section
5 of the OSHAct. Because Section 112(r) specifi-
cally ties its general duty obligation to the general
duty clause of the OSHAct, case law interpreting the
OSHAct provision should be directly relevant.
Specifically, in the General Dynamics case, the
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals
held that standards and the general duty obligation
are distinct and independent requirements and that
compliance with a standard does not discharge an
employer’s duty to comply with the general duty
obligation. Similarly, compliance with other Clean
Air act chemical safety requirements should not re-
lieve a firm’s duty to comply with the act’s gen-
eral duty clause. Further, the requirement on owners
and operators to design and maintain a safe facility
would seem to extend their obligations into the area
of primary prevention rather then merely hazard
control.
The Clean Air Act also requires each state to
establish programs to provide small business with
technical assistance in addressing chemical safety.
These programs could provide information on alter-
native technologies, process changes, products, and
methods of operation that help reduce emissions to
air. However, these state mandates are unfunded and
may not be uniformly implemented. Where they
are established, linkage with state offices of tech-
nical assistance, especially those that provide guid-
ance on pollution prevention, could be particularly
beneficial.
Finally, the 1990 amendments established an in-
dependent Chemical Safety and Hazard Investiga-
tion Board (CSHIB). The board is to investigate the
causes of accidents, perform research on preven-
tion, and make recommendations for preventive ap-
proaches, much like the Air Transportation Safety
Board does with regard to airplane safety.
As required by the 1990 Clean Air Amendments,
in 1992 OSHA promulgated a standard requiring
chemical PSM in the workplace that became ef-
fective later that year. The PSM standard is de-
signed to protect employees working in facilities
that use “highly hazardous chemicals” and employ-
ees working in facilities with more than 10,000
pounds of flammable liquids or gases present in
one location. The list of highly hazardous chemi-
cals in the standard includes acutely toxic, highly
flammable, and reactive substances. The PSM stan-
dard requires employers to compile safety informa-
tion (including process flow information) on chem-
icals and processes used in the workplace, complete
a workplace process hazard analysis every 5 years,
conduct triennial compliance safety audits, develop
and implement written operating procedures, con-
duct extensive worker training, develop and im-
plement plans to maintain the integrity of process
equipment, perform pre-startup reviews for new
(and significantly modified) facilities, develop and
implement written procedures to manage changes
in production methods, establish an emergency ac-
tion plan, and investigate accidents and near-misses
at their facilities. Many aspects of chemical safety
are not covered by specific workplace standards.
Most that do apply to chemical safety have their
origin in the consensus standards adopted under
Section 6(a) of the OSHAct in 1971 and hence are
greatly out of date. Arguably, the general duty obli-
gation of the OSHAct imposes a duty to seek out
technological improvements that would improve
safety for workers.
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In 1996, the EPA promulgated regulations set-
ting forth requirements for the RMPs specified in
the Clean Air Act. The RMP rule is modeled after
the OSHA PSM standard and is estimated to af-
fect some 66,000 facilities. The rule requires a haz-
ard assessment (involving an offsite consequence
analysis—including worst-case risk scenarios—
and compilation of a 5-year accident history), a pre-
vention program to address the hazards identified,
and an emergency response program. In 2003, the
Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board
urged OSHA to amend its 1996 regulations in order
to achieve more comprehensive control of “reactive
hazards” that could have catastrophic consequences
and asked OSHA to define and record information
on reactive chemical incidents that it investigates
or is required to investigate. These recommenda-
tions have largely fallen on deaf ears. The board
also expressed concern that the material safety data
sheets (MSDSs) issued by OSHA do not adequately
identify the reactive potential of chemicals. Leg-
islation is being promoted to require OSHA to
prepare or revise MSDSs for the list of chemi-
cals in the PSM standard and generally strengthen
OSHA’s approach to chemical safety. Despite the
fact that a memorandum of understanding between
EPA and OSHA had been signed in 1996, in 2001
the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) issued
a report indicating the need for better coordina-
tion between EPA, OSHA, the CSHIB, and other
agencies.
ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES
Regulations and standard setting, of course, are only
the beginning of the regulatory process. For a regu-
latory system to be effective, there must be a clear
commitment to the enforcement of standards (see
Chapter 37). Under OSHA, a worker can request
a workplace inspection if the request is in writ-
ing and signed. Anonymity is preserved on request.
When an inspector visits a workplace, a representa-
tive of the workers can accompany the inspector on
the “walk-around.”If specific requests for inspec-
tions are not made, OSHA makes random inspec-
tions of those workplaces with worse-than-average
safety records. However, the inspection frequency
is low. Furthermore, firms with significant expo-
sures to chemicals may not be routinely inspected,
simply because their record for injuries—which
make up the overwhelming majority of the reported
statistics—is good.
Inspections are usually conducted without ad-
vance notice, but an employer may insist that OSHA
inspectors obtain a court order before entering
the workplace. Federal OSHA continues to have
approximately 1,000 inspectors, and state agen-
cies have approximately another 2,000. OSHA and
OSHA-approved state programs conducted approx-
imately 97,000 annual inspections in the federal fis-
cal year 2002, focusing inspections on the most haz-
ardous industries, construction and manufacturing.
Clearly, not all 6 million workplaces covered by
the OSHAct could be inspected on anything like a
regular basis. With the relatively recent expansion
of OSHA authority to cover U.S. post offices, the
agency continues to be short of the resources needed
to perform its statutory duties. In sharp contrast, the
number of inspectors per worker is 10 times larger
in British Columbia, Canada, and in many Euro-
pean countries.
OSHA can fine employers up to $7,000 for each
violation of the act that is discovered during a work-
place inspection and up to $70,000 or up to 6 months
imprisonment if the violation is willful or repeated.
The failure to abate hazards can result in a $7,000
fine per day. These penalties are very much less
than those for violations of environmental statutes.
Since Congress last adjusted OSHA’s civil penal-
ties, those fines are in effect 38 percent lower, when
pegged to inflation. Management can appeal viola-
tions, amounts of fines, methods of correcting haz-
ards, and deadlines for correcting hazards (abate-
ment dates). Workers can appeal only deadlines.
All appeals are processed through the Occupational
Safety and Health Review Commission, established
by the OSHAct.
The OSHAct requires OSHA to encourage states
to develop and operate their own job safety and
health programs. State programs, when “at least as
effective” as the federal program, can take over en-
forcement activities. Once a state plan is approved,
OSHA funds half of its operating costs. Approxi-
mately 20 state plans, which OSHA monitors, are
in effect. State safety and health standards under
such approved plans must keep pace with OSHA
standards, and state plans must guarantee employer
and employee rights, as does OSHA.
During the 1980s, OSHA inspection policy re-
sulted in directives given to the field staff to deem-
phasize general duty violations. In addition, inspec-
tors were actually evaluated by the managers of the
establishments they inspected. Follow-up inspec-
tions after violations were often restricted to checks
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by telephone. Thus, incentives for aggressive in-
spection activity were not great under the Reagan
and Bush administrations. Although inspection ac-
tivity increased under the Clinton administration,
it has retreated under the second Bush adminis-
tration. Although inspections were up in numbers,
in the Clinton administration, the time spent on in-
spections was less.
Enforcement of laws administered by the EPA
is initiated by the agency under its various legisla-
tive mandates. As with OSHA, agency activity has
been greatly inadequate over the past 25 years, with
increased responsibilities and the lack of a corre-
sponding increase in human resources since 1980.
WORKER AND COMMUNITY
RIGHT TO KNOW
The right of workers and citizens to be apprised of
the substances to which they are exposed is popu-
larly referred to as “the right to know.” This simple
term actually encompasses several rights and duties
that are complex and complementary. Political and
legislative initiatives focusing on the right to know
arose during a time when direct regulation of toxic
substances was being deemphasized by the federal
agencies. Historically, regulatory initiatives under
the 1970 OSHAct encompassing the worker right-
to-know preceded by more than 15 years the more
general community right-to-know efforts embod-
ied in the 1986 Emergency Planning and Commu-
nity Right to Know Act (EPCRA), but the worker
right-to-know initiatives are relevant to, and greatly
influenced, the evolution of the community right-to-
know.
Although the initiatives for the worker right
to know and the community right to know both
initially focused on “scientific” information about
chemicals—(a) product ingredients and the spe-
cific composition of pollution in air, water, and
waste; (b) the inherent toxicity and safety hazard
of the related chemicals, materials, and industrial
processes; and (c) information related to exposure
of various vulnerable groups to harmful substances
and processes—disseminating or providing access
to other categories of information, namely tech-
nological information, and legal information1 may
be even more important for empowering workers
and citizens to facilitate a transformation of haz-
ardous industry and practices. Technological infor-
mation includes (a) monitoring technologies, (b)
options that control or minimize pollution, waste,
and chemical accidents, and (c) available substi-
tute or alternative inputs, final products, and pro-
cesses that prevent pollution, waste, and chemical
accidents. Legal information refers to notification
of the rights and obligations of producers, employ-
ers, consumers, workers, and the general public.
Though important, legal information is not a fun-
damental type of information but rather the (man-
dated) diffusion of information about rights and du-
ties stemming from the nature and exposure profiles
of hazardous substances and processes.
Worker Right to Know
The transfer of information regarding workplace
exposure to toxic substances has received consid-
erable public attention. Workers need an accurate
picture of the nature and extent of probable chemi-
cal exposures to decide whether to enter or remain
in a particular workplace. Workers also need to have
knowledge regarding past or current exposures to
be alert to the onset of occupational disease. Reg-
ulatory agencies must have timely access to such
information if they are to devise effective strate-
gies to reduce disease and death from occupational
exposures to toxic substances. Accordingly, laws
designed to facilitate this flow of information have
been promulgated at the federal, state, and local lev-
els. Indeed, the right to know has become a political
battleground in many states and communities and
has been the subject of intensive organizing efforts
by business, labor, and citizen-action groups.
In essence, the right to know embodies a democ-
ratization of the workplace. It is the mandatory shar-
ing of information between management and labor.
Through a variety of laws, manufacturers and em-
ployers are directed to disclose information regard-
ing toxic substance exposure to workers, to unions
in their capacity as worker representatives, and to
governmental agencies charged with the protection
of public health. The underlying rationale for these
directives is the assumption that this transfer of in-
formation will prompt activity that will improve
worker health.
Although the phrase right to know is a useful
generic designation, it is an inadequate descrip-
tion of the legal rights and obligations that govern
the transfer of workplace information on toxic sub-
stances. A person cannot have a meaningful right
to information unless someone else has a corre-
sponding duty to provide that information. Thus,
a worker’s right to know is secured by requiring a
manufacturer or employer to disclose. The disclo-
sure requirement can take a variety of forms, and
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the practical scope of that requirement may depend
on the nature of the form chosen. In particular, a
duty to disclose only such information as has been
requested may provide a narrower flow of informa-
tion than a duty to disclose all information, regard-
less of whether it has been requested. The various
rights and obligations in the area of toxics informa-
tion transfer may be grouped into three categories.
Although they share a number of similarities, each
category is conceptually distinct:
1. The duty to generate or retain information refers
to the obligation to compile a record of certain
workplace events or activities or to maintain such
a record for a specified period of time if it has
been compiled. An employer may, for example,
be required to monitor its workers regularly for
evidence of toxic exposures (biological monitor-
ing) and to keep written records of the results of
such monitoring.
2. The right of access (and the corresponding duty
to disclose on request) refers to the right of a
worker, a union, or an agency to request and
secure access to information held by a man-
ufacturer or employer. Such a right of access
would provide workers with a means of obtain-
ing copies of biological monitoring records per-
taining to their own exposure to toxic substances.
3. Finally, the duty to inform refers to an em-
ployer’s or manufacturer’s obligation to dis-
close, without request, information pertaining to
toxic substance exposures in the workplace. An
employer may, for example, have a duty, inde-
pendent of any worker’s exercise of a right to
access, to inform workers whenever biological
monitoring reveals that their exposure to a toxic
substance has produced bodily concentrations of
that substance above a specified level.
In general, the broadest coverage is found in rights
and duties emanating from the OSHAct. By its
terms, that act is applicable to all private employers
and thus covers the bulk of workplace exposures
to toxic substances. Most private industrial work-
places are also subject to the National Labor Rela-
tions Act (NLRA). Farm workers and workers sub-
ject to the Railway Labor Act, however, are exempt
from NLRA coverage. TSCA provides a generally
narrower scope. Although many of the act’s provi-
sions apply broadly to both chemical manufacture
and use, its information transfer requirements ex-
tend only to chemical manufacturers, processors,
and importers. On the state level, the relevant cov-
erage of the various rights and duties depends on the
specifics of the particular state and local law defin-
ing them. In general, common-law rights and duties
evidence much less variation than those created by
state statute or local ordinance.
Under OSHA’s Hazard Communication Stan-
dard, employers have a duty to inform workers of
the identity of substances with which they work
through labeling the product container and disclos-
ing to the purchaser (the employer) using MSDSs.
Employers are under no obligation to amend
inadequate, insufficient, or incorrect information
provided by the manufacturer. Employers must,
however, transmit certain information to their em-
ployees: (a) information on the standard and its re-
quirements, (b) operations in their work areas where
hazardous chemicals are present, and (c) the loca-
tion and availability of the company’s hazard com-
munication program. The standard also requires
that workers must be trained in (a) methods to de-
tect the presence or release of the hazardous chem-
icals; (b) the physical and health hazards of the
chemicals; (c) protective measures, such as appro-
priate work practices, emergency procedures, and
personal protective equipment; and (d) the details of
the hazard communication program developed by
the employer, including an explanation of the label-
ing system and the MSDSs and how employees can
obtain and use hazard information.
Rights and duties governing toxic information
transfer in the workplace can originate from a
variety of sources. Some are grounded in state
common-law, whereas others arise out of specific
state statutes or local ordinances. Although the
states have been increasingly active in this field,
the primary source of regulation is federal law. Most
federal regulation in this area emanates from three
statutes: the OSHAct of 1970, the Toxic Substances
Control Act of 1976, and the National Labor Rela-
tions Act (NLRA), the last of which is administered
by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).
The scope of a particular right or duty depends
on many factors. The first, and perhaps most im-
portant, is the nature of the information required to
be transferred. As discussed above, the main cate-
gories of information can be divided into scientific,
technological, and legal information. In the context
of the workplace, scientific information can be di-
vided into three subcategories:
1. Ingredients information provides the worker
with the identity of the substances to which he or
she is exposed. Depending on the circumstances,
this information may constitute only the generic
P1: PIB/OTB P2: PIB/OTB QC: IML/OTB T1: IML
GRBT089-03 Levy-2251G GRBT089-v9.cls September 24, 2005 7:8
60 SECTION I ● Work, Environment, and Health
classifications of the various chemicals involved
or may include the specific chemical identities of
all chemical exposures and the specific contents
of all chemical mixtures.
2. Exposure information encompasses all data re-
garding the amount, frequency, duration, and
route of workplace exposures. This information
may be of a general nature, such as the results
of ambient air monitoring at a central workplace
location, or may take individualized form, such
as the results of personal environmental or bio-
logical monitoring of a specific worker.
3. Health effects information indicates known or
potential health effects of workplace exposures.
This information may be general data regarding
the effects of chemical exposure, usually found
in an MSDS or a published or unpublished work-
place epidemiologic study, or it may be indi-
vidualized data, such as worker medical records
compiled as a result of medical surveillance.
The federal standard preempts state right-to-know
laws in the worker notification area in a minority of
jurisdictions; it would appear to be coexistent with
state requirements in most jurisdictions, although
its stated intent is to preempt all state efforts.
Under OSHA’s Medical Access Rule, an em-
ployer may not limit or deny an employee access to
his or her own medical or exposure records. The cur-
rent OSHA regulation, promulgated in 1980, grants
employees a general right of access to medical and
exposure records kept by their employer. Further-
more, it requires the employer to preserve and main-
tain these records for 30 years. There appears to
be some overlap in the definitions of medical and
exposure records, because both may include the
results of biological monitoring. Medical records,
however, are in general defined as those pertaining
to “the health status of an employee,” whereas the
exposure records are defined as those pertaining to
“employee exposure to toxic substances or harmful
physical agents.”
The employer’s duty to make these records avail-
able is a broad one. The regulations provide that on
any employee request for access to a medical or
exposure record, “the employer shall assure that
access is provided in a reasonable time, place, and
manner, but in no event later than 15 days after the
request for access is made.”
An employee’s right of access to medical records
is limited to records pertaining specifically to that
employee. The regulations allow physicians some
discretion as well in limiting employee access. The
physician is permitted to “recommend” to the em-
ployee requesting access that the employee (a) re-
view and discuss the records with the physician,
(b) accept a summary rather than the records them-
selves, or (c) allow the records to be released instead
to another physician. Furthermore, where informa-
tion in a record pertains to a “specific diagnosis of
a terminal illness or a psychiatric condition,” the
physician is authorized to direct that such informa-
tion be provided only to the employee’s designated
representative. Although these provisions were ap-
parently intended to respect the physician–patient
relationship and do not limit the employee’s ulti-
mate right of access, they could be abused. In sit-
uations in which the physician feels loyalty to the
employer rather than the employee, the physician
could use these provisions to discourage the em-
ployee from seeking access to his or her records.
Similar constraints do not apply to employee ac-
cess to exposure records. Not only is the employee
ensured access to records of his or her own expo-
sure to toxic substances, but the employee is also
ensured access to the exposure records of other em-
ployees “with past or present job duties or working
conditions related to or similar to those of the em-
ployee.” In addition, the employee has access to all
general exposure information pertaining to the em-
ployee’s workplace or working conditions and to
any workplace or working condition to which he or
she is to be transferred. All information in exposure
records that cannot be correlated with a particular
employee’s exposure is accessible.
One criticism of the OSHA regulation is that it
does not require the employer to compile medical
or exposure information but merely requires em-
ployee access to such information if it is compiled.
The scope of the regulation, however, should not be
underestimated. The term record is meant to be “all-
encompassing,” and the access requirement appears
to extend to all information gathered on employee
health or exposure, no matter how it is measured
or recorded. Thus, if an employer embarks on any
program of human monitoring, no matter how con-
ducted, he or she must provide the subjects access to
the results. This access requirement may serve as a
disincentive for employers to monitor employee ex-
posure or health if it is not clearly in the employer’s
interest to do so.
The regulations permit the employer to deny ac-
cess to “trade secret data which discloses manufac-
turing processes or . . . the percentage of a chemical
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substance in a mixture,” provided that the employer
(a) notifies the party requesting access of the de-
nial; (b) if relevant, provides alternative informa-
tion sufficient to permit identification of when and
where exposure occurred; and (c) provides access
to all “chemical or physical agent identities includ-
ing chemical names, levels of exposure, and em-
ployee health status data contained in the requested
records.”
The key feature of this provision is that it en-
sures employee access to the precise identities of
chemicals and physical agents. This access is espe-
cially critical for chemical exposures. Within each
“generic” class of chemicals, there are a variety of
specific chemical compounds, each of which may
have its own particular effect on human health. The
health effects can vary widely within a particular
family of chemicals. Accordingly, the medical and
scientific literature on chemical properties and tox-
icity is indexed by specific chemical name, not by
generic chemical class. To discern any meaning-
ful correlation between a chemical exposure and a
known or potential health effect, an employee must
know the precise chemical identity of that exposure.
Furthermore, in the case of biological monitoring,
the identity of the toxic substance or its metabolite
is itself the information monitored.
Particularly in light of the public health
emphasis inherent in the OSHAct, disclosure of
such information does not constitute an unreason-
able infringement on the trade secret interests of the
employer. In general, chemical health and safety
data are the least valuable to an employer of all
the proprietary information relevant to a particular
manufacturing process.
TSCA imposes substantial requirements on
chemical manufacturers and processors to develop
health effects data. TSCA requires testing, premar-
ket manufacturing notification, and reporting and
retention of information. TSCA imposes no spe-
cific medical surveillance or biological monitoring
requirements. However, to the extent that human
monitoring is used to meet more general require-
ments of assessing occupational health or exposure
to toxic substances, the data resulting from such
monitoring are subject to an employer’s recording
and retention obligations.
EPA has promulgated regulations requiring gen-
eral reporting on several hundred chemicals, includ-
ing information related to occupational exposure.
The EPA administrator may require the reporting
and maintenance of those data “insofar as known”
or “insofar as reasonably ascertainable.” Thus, if
monitoring is undertaken, it must be reported. EPA
appears to be authorized to require monitoring as
a way of securing information that is “reasonably
ascertainable.”
In addition to the general reports required for
specific chemicals listed in the regulations, EPA
has promulgated rules for the submission of health
and safety studies required for several hundred sub-
stances. A health and safety study includes “[a]ny
data that bear on the effects of chemical substance
on health.” Examples are “[m]onitoring data, when
they have been aggregated and analyzed to measure
the exposure of humans . . . to a chemical substance
or mixture.” Only data that are “known” or “reason-
ably ascertainable” need be reported.
Records of “significant adverse reactions to [em-
ployee] health” must be retained for 30 years un-
der Section 8(c). A rule implementing this section
defines significant adverse reactions as those “that
may indicate a substantial impairment of normal
activities, or long-lasting or irreversible damage to
health or the environment.” Under the rule, human
monitoring data, especially if derived from a suc-
cession of tests, would seem especially reportable.
Genetic monitoring of employees, if some basis
links the results with increased risk of cancer, also
seems to fall within the rule.
Section 8(e) imposes a statutory duty to report
“immediately . . . information which supports the
conclusion that [a] substance or mixture presents a
substantial risk of injury to health.” In a policy state-
ment issued in 1978, the EPA interpreted “immedi-
ately” in this context to require receipt by the agency
within 15 working days after the reporter obtains the
information. Substantial risk is defined exclusive
of economic considerations. Evidence can be pro-
vided by either designed, controlled studies or un-
designed, uncontrolled studies, including “medical
and health surveys” or evidence of effects in work-
ers. From 1978 to 2003, EPA received more than
25,000 8(e) submissions. During the years 2001 and
2002, 19 to 21 percent of these reports addressed
reproductive/developmental toxicity; 7.5 to 14 per-
cent, ecotoxicity; 9 to 11 percent, cancer; and 5 to
11 percent, mutagenicity.2
In the EPA’s rule for Section 8(c), Section 8(e)
is distinguished from Section 8(c) in that “[a] re-
port of substantial risk of injury, unlike an alle-
gation of a significant adverse reaction, is accom-
panied by information which reasonably supports
the seriousness of the effect or the probability of
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its occurrence.” Human monitoring results indicat-
ing a substantial risk of injury would thus seem
reportable to EPA. Either medical surveillance or
biological monitoring data would seem to qualify.
Section 14(b) of TSCA gives EPA authority to dis-
close from health and safety studies the data per-
taining to chemical identities, except for the pro-
portion of chemicals in a mixture. In addition, EPA
may disclose information, otherwise classified as
a trade secret, “if the Administration determines it
necessary to protect . . . against an unreasonable
risk of injury to health.” Monitoring data thus seem
subject to full disclosure.
In addition to the access provided by OSHA reg-
ulations, individual employees may have a limited
right of access to medical and exposure records un-
der federal labor law. Logically, the right to refuse
hazardous work (see later discussion), inherent in
Section 7 of the NLRA and Section 502 of the Labor
Management Relations Act, carries with it the right
of access to the information necessary to determine
whether or not a particular condition is hazardous.
In the case of toxic substance exposure, this right of
access may mean access to all information relevant
to the health effects of the exposure and may in-
clude access to both medical and exposure records.
These federal labor law provisions are clearly not
adequate substitutes for OSHA access regulations,
however, because there is no systematic mechanism
for enforcing this right.
Collective employee access, however, is avail-
able to unionized employees through the collec-
tive bargaining process. In four cases, the NLRB
has held that unions have a right of access to
exposure and medical records so that they may
bargain effectively with the employer regarding
conditions of employment. Citing the general
proposition that employers are required to bargain
on health and safety conditions when requested to
do so, the NLRB adopted a broad policy favoring
union access: “Few matters can be of greater legit-
imate concern to individuals in the workplace, and
thus to the bargaining agent representing them, than
exposure to conditions potentially threatening their
health, well-being, or their very lives.”
The NLRB, however, did not grant an unlim-
ited right of access. The union’s right of access is
constrained by the individual employee’s right of
personal privacy. Furthermore, the NLRB acknowl-
edged an employer’s interest in protecting trade se-
crets. Although ordering the employer in each of the
four cases to disclose the chemical identities of sub-
stances to which the employer did not assert a trade
secret defense, the NLRB indicated that employers
are entitled to take reasonable steps to safeguard “le-
gitimate” trade secret information. The NLRB did
not delineate a specific mechanism for achieving
the balance between union access and trade secret
disclosure. Instead, it ordered the parties to attempt
to resolve the issue through collective bargaining.
Given the complexity of this issue and the potential
for abuse in the name of “trade secret protection,”
the NLRB may find it necessary to provide further
specificity before a workable industry-wide mech-
anism can be achieved.
The legal avenues for worker and agency access
to information relevant to workplace exposures to
toxic substances have been expanded substantially.
Despite certain inadequacies in the current laws and
despite current attempts by OSHA to narrow the
scope of some of these even further, access to tox-
ics data remains broader than it has ever been. By
itself, however, this fact is of little significance. The
mere existence of information transfer laws means
little unless those laws are used aggressively to fur-
ther the objective of the right to know: the protec-
tion of workers’ health.The various rights and duties
governing toxics information transfer in the work-
place present workers, unions, and agencies with
an important opportunity. The extent to which they
seize this opportunity is a measure of their resolve to
bring about meaningful improvement in the health
of the American worker.
The category of technological information is not
addressed in the context of worker right to know,
although it has been argued that shifting the focus of
debate between workers and management from the
risks in the workplace to a discussion of [technolog-
ical] solutions may be a much more fruitful avenue
for collective bargaining.3 In contrast, information
about technology and approaches for reducing toxic
substance exposure and the chances of sudden and
accidental releases of chemicals (discussed below)
is reflected in community right-to-know initiatives.
Community Right to Know
In 1986, Congress amended the federal hazardous
waste cleanup law (commonly referred to as the
Superfund statute) with the Superfund Amend-
ment and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (known as
SARA). Beyond cleanup, Congress took in SARA
what may prove to be a significant step toward re-
ducing the likelihood of new hazardous substance
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contamination in the future. Title III of SARA,
called the Emergency Planning and Community
Right to Know Act (EPCRA), now codified at 42
U.S.C. §§11001, et seq., is a comprehensive federal
community right-to-know program, implemented
by the states under guidelines promulgated by EPA.
The central feature of this federal program is broad
public dissemination of information pertaining to
the nature and identity of chemicals used at com-
mercial facilities.
Although EPCRA is not a workplace right-to-
know law per se, it does provide an alternative
means through which many employees can learn
about toxic substance use, not only in their own
workplaces but in other workplaces in which they
may wish to work.
EPCRA has four major provisions:
• Emergency planning (§§301–303)
• Emergency release notification (§304)
• Hazardous chemical storage reporting require-
ments (§§311–312)
• The Toxic Chemical Release Inventory (TRI)
(§313)
The various requirements are summarized in Table
3-2 and are discussed below.
The implementation of EPCRA began with the
creation of state and local bodies to implement this
community right-to-know program. Section 301 of
the act required the governor of each state to appoint
a state emergency response commission (SERC), to
be staffed by “persons who have technical expertise
ˆˆ ˆˆ
T A B L E 3 - 2
EPCRA Chemicals, Reportable Actions, and Reporting Thresholds
Section 302 Section 304 Sections 311/312 Section 313 (TRI)
Chemicals covered 356 extremely
hazardous substances










present on site at any
one time requires
notification of the
SERC and LEPC within





in a 24-hour period;
reportable to the
SERC and LEPC.
TPQ or 500 lb for
Section 302
chemicals; 10,000 lb
present on site at any








25,000 lb per year
manufactured or
processed; 10,000 lb





report to EPA and the
state by July 1.
MSDS, material safety data sheet; OSHA, Occupational Safety and Health Administration; EPA, Environmental Protection Agency; EPCRA,
Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act; SERC, State Emergency Response Commission; LEPC, Local Emergency Planning
Committee; TRI, Toxics Release Inventory; TPQ, Threshold Planning Quantity.
a MSDSs on hazardous chemicals are maintained by a number of universities and can be accessed through <http://www.hazard.com>.
b The TRI reporting requirement applies to all federal facilities that have 10 or more full-time employees and those that manufacture (including
importing), process, or otherwise use a listed toxic chemical above threshold quantities and that are in one of the following sectors:
Manufacturing (Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes 20 through 39), Metal mining (SIC code 10, except for SIC codes 1011,1081,
and 1094), Coal mining (SIC code 12, except for 1241 and extraction activities), Electrical utilities that combust coal and/or oil (SIC codes
4911, 4931, and 4939), Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), Subtitle C hazardous waste treatment and disposal facilities (SIC
code 4953), Chemicals and allied products wholesale distributors (SIC code 5169), Petroleum bulk plants and terminals (SIC code 5171),
and Solvent recovery services (SIC code 7389).
Source: The Community Planning and Right-to-Know Act, EPA 550-F-00-004, March 2000.
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in the emergency response field.” In practice, these
state commissions have tended to include represen-
tatives from the various environmental and public
health and safety agencies in the state. Each state
commission, in turn, was required to divide the state
into various local emergency planning districts and
to appoint a local emergency planning committee
(LEPC) for each of these districts. These state and
local entities are responsible for receiving, coordi-
nating, maintaining, and providing access to the var-
ious types of information required to be disclosed
under the act.
EPCRA established four principal requirements
for reporting information about hazardous chemi-
cals. Section 304 requires all facilities that manufac-
ture, process, use, or store certain “extremely haz-
ardous substances” in excess of certain quantities to
provide “emergency” notification to the SERC and
the LEPC of an unexpected release of one of these
substances. Section 311 requires facilities covered
by the OSHA Hazard Communication Standard to
prepare and submit to the LEPC and the local fire
department MSDSs for chemicals covered by the
OSHA standard. Under Section 312, many of these
same firms are required to prepare and submit to the
LEPC an emergency and hazardous substance in-
ventory form that describes the amount and location
of certain hazardous chemicals on their premises.
Finally, Section 313 requires firms in the manufac-
turing sector to provide to EPA an annual reporting
of certain routine releases of hazardous substances.
These reports comprise what is known as the Tox-
ics Release Inventory (TRI). In addition, Section
303 requires certain commercial facilities to co-
operate with their respective LEPCs in preparing
“emergency response plans” for dealing with ma-
jor accidents involving hazardous chemicals. The
applicability of these provisions to any particular
facility depends on the amount of the designated
chemicals that it uses or stores during any given
year.
Taken as a whole, these requirements constitute
a broad federal declaration that firms that choose
to rely heavily on hazardous chemicals in their pro-
duction processes may not treat information regard-
ing their use of those chemicals as their private
domain. Indeed, except for trade secrecy protec-
tions that generally parallel those available under
the OSHA Hazard Communication Standard, there
are no statutory restrictions on the disclosure of
EPCRA information to the general public. Indeed,
Section 324 of the act mandates that most of the
information subject to EPCRA reporting require-
ments “be made available to the general public”
upon request and requires that each local emergency
planning committee publicize this fact in a local
newspaper. However, since the September 11 ter-
rorist attacks, EPA is undertaking a review of the
proper balance to strike between the public’s right to
know and the possible increased risk to disseminat-
ing information collected under the informational
provisions of various legislation.
EPCRA requires certain industries to report the
releases and transfers of certain chemical sub-
stances to air, water, land, or transferred off-site.
The data have to be entered on a standardized form
and are collected by EPA in the TRI, which is pub-
licly available.∗ The number of chemicals that are
covered is about 650—double the number required
in 1987.
The TRI imposes its requirements on firms hav-
ing more than 10 employees and that manufacture
or process† More than 25,000 pounds per year, or
use 10,000 pounds per year of the designated chemi-
cals. For some six persistent, bioaccumulative, and
toxic chemicals (PBTs), EPA lowered the report-
ing thresholds in 1999 to 100 lb, for 11 highly
persistent and highly bioaccumulative chemicals to
10 lb, and for dioxin and dioxin-like compounds
to 0.1 g. All 6,100 facilities of the manufacturing
sector and several other industries including metal
and coal mining, electric utilities, and commercial
hazardous waste treatment, among others, are re-
quired to report. Approximately 6 to 7 percent of
all chemical releases are subject to TRI reporting.
In addition to the reporting requirements for chem-
icals releases, EPCRA now includes requirements
to report pollution-prevention activities.‡ The po-
tential power of TRI depends on the extent to which
the data represents actual releases and the quality
of the data, as well as the capacity of the public
to understand and interpret the data. Considering
the representativeness of the data, TRI focuses only
∗
The data can be found on EPA’s Webpage
<http://www.epa.gov/tri/>.†
The term manufacture means to produce, prepare, import,
or compound a toxic chemical. The term process means
the preparation of a toxic chemical, after its
manufacture, for distribution in commerce. See 42 U.S.C.
11023 (b)(1)(C). See also 42 U.S.C. 11023 (a)(b)(1) and
(g)(2).‡
The Pollution Prevention Act (PPA) of 1990 advocates a
general shift in approach from pollution control to
pollution prevention. The PPA amends EPCRA and adds
further requirements to report the firms’
pollution-prevention activities to EPA. These include
source-reduction and waste-management practices.
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on the releases of chemicals and does not include
releases that occur during the whole life cycle of a
product. A reported reduction of reported chemical
releases does not necessarily mean a total reduc-
tion of all releases, because there could be shifts
in releases from covered to not-covered chemicals.
The firms are not required to produce risk informa-
tion about the covered substances but only have to
report their releases, so the public may have an inad-
equate picture of what changes in reported releases
mean in terms of reduction (or increases) in over-
all risk. In addition, within the covered substances,
no distinction is highlighted between the different
severity (health or environmental consequences) of
different releases. Aside from the recent exception
of reporting the specific categories of the persistent,
bioaccumulative, and toxic chemicals, unless inter-
ested observers factor in differential hazardousness
of different releases, they cannot make a meaning-
ful assessment of changes in overall risk. In addi-
tion, many of the releases directly to air and water
have simply been transferred to the waste stream,
and it is extremely difficult to evaluate the resulting
consequences for overall risk.
Although there are limitations of using the TRI
data as a good environmental indicator, the publi-
cation of the data appeared to have had an enor-
mous positive impact on the reduction of reported
releases. During the 1988–2001 period, on- and off-
site releases of the core chemicals were reduced
by 55 percent while the production of chemicals
increased. Forty percent of the decreases were al-
ready reached by 1995. However, although emis-
sions to air and water decreased, there were corre-
sponding large increases in hazardous waste. As a
result, the success of the TRI reporting is far from
clear.
The September 11 terrorist attacks have brought
in a new dimension to the right to know. The Clean
Air Act requires that chemical manufacturers and
refineries file start-up, shut-down, and malfunction
(SSM) plans with EPA or state air regulators. Indus-
try has argued that public access to this information
increases the vulnerability of those facilities to ter-
rorist attacks and has requested of EPA that indus-
try not be required to routinely submit those plans.
EPA countered with a proposal that the information
could be screened before dissemination. EPA has
since dismantled its risk management website con-
taining general information about emergency plans
and chemicals used at 15,000 sites nationwide, al-
lowing selective access to sensitive information
contained in the Offsite Consequence Analysis—
about “worst case” chemical accidents—in special
reading rooms.
THE RIGHT TO REFUSE
HAZARDOUS WORK
The NLRA and the OSHAct provide many employ-
ees a limited right to refuse to perform hazardous
work. When properly exercised, this right protects
an employee from retaliatory discharge or other dis-
criminatory action for refusing hazardous work and
incorporates a remedy providing both reinstatement
and back pay. The nature of this right under the
NLRA depends on the relevant collective bargain-
ing agreement, if there is one. Nonunion employees
and union employees whose collective bargaining
agreements specifically exclude health and safety
from a no-strike clause have the collective right to
stage a safety walkout under Section 7 of the NLRA.
If they choose to walk out based on a good-faith be-
lief that working conditions are unsafe, they will be
protected from any employer retaliation. Union em-
ployees who are subject to a comprehensive collec-
tive bargaining agreement may avail themselves of
the provisions of Section 502 of the NLRA. Under
this section, an employee who is faced with “abnor-
mally dangerous conditions” has an individual right
to leave the job site. The right may be exercised,
however, only where the existence of abnormally
dangerous conditions can be objectively verified.
Both exposure and medical information are crucial
here (see Chapter 4).
Under a 1973 OSHA regulation, the right to
refuse hazardous work extends to all employees, in-
dividually, of private employers, regardless of the
existence or nature of a collective bargaining agree-
ment. Section 11(c) of the OSHAct protects an em-
ployee from discharge or other retaliatory action
arising out of his or her “exercise” of “any right”
afforded by the act. The Secretary of Labor has pro-
mulgated regulations under this section defining a
right to refuse hazardous work in certain circum-
stances: where an employee reasonably believes
there is a “real danger of death or serious injury,”
there is insufficient time to eliminate that danger
through normal administrative channels, and the
employer has failed to comply with an employee
request to correct the situation.
Under the federal Mine Safety and Health Act,
miners also have rights to transfer from unhealthy
work areas if there is exposure to toxic substances
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In the 1980s, OSHA turned to negotiated rule-
making allowed by the revisions to the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act. However, negotiation for the
benzene standard failed, and, in 1983, OSHA is-
sued a standard essentially the same as had been
remanded by the U.S. Supreme Court, but with
the required scientific/risk-assessment justification.
OSHA then promulgated formally negotiated stan-
dards for formaldehyde in 1992 and methylenedi-
aniline in 1992 and used an informal negotiation
process for the butadiene standard issued in 1996,
but they were neither as protective as the law would
have allowed nor as technology-forcing.4
Although OSHA standard-setting efforts contin-
ued in the latter part of the 1990s, its early commit-
ment to worker protection has been further seriously
compromised by both procedural requirements
imposed by new legislation and by the chilling ef-
fect that this legislation has had on agency willing-
ness to set stringent standards. This legislation—
the Regulatory Flexibility Act, the Paperwork
Reduction Act, the Unfunded Mandates Reform
Act, the Small Business Regulatory Enforce-
ment Fairness Act, and the National Technology
Transfer and Advancement Act—has placed time-
consuming burdens on the agency, contributing to a
serious slowdown and resource intensiveness in the
development of standards, compounding the effects
of executive (presidential) orders requiring the Of-
fice of Management and Budget to review OSHA’s
assessment of costs and benefits for major rules,
defined as those having more than $100 million in
costs per year.
Equally disturbing is the inadequacy of protec-
tion offered by some of the new health standards.
The standard for the carcinogen methylene chloride
was finally promulgated in 1997—after 13 years of
delay. The United Autoworkers Union (UAW) first
petitioned OSHA in 1987 for a reduction of the
permissible 8-hour exposure allowed by the prior
PEL of 500 to 10 ppm. OSHA promulgated a stan-
dard of 25 ppm, without medical removal protec-
tion. That level was argued to present a lifetime
cancer risk of 1 in 1,000 for the average exposed
worker (and ensured that 95 percent of the workers
were exposed to no lifetime risk higher than 3.6 in
1,000), a risk considerably greater than that allowed
in prior standards for individual carcinogens, such
as vinyl chloride and benzene (but in line with the
lax formaldehyde standard), and in sharp contrast
to the level of 1 in 1 million required by the Clean
Air Act of 1990 for environmental ambient air ex-
posures to carcinogens. Originally challenging the
standard in court as being too lax, the UAW nego-
tiated a legal settlement with the opposing industry
for a revision of the standard, retaining the 25 ppm
level but adding medical surveillance and removal
requirements. Legislation introduced in Congress
to veto the standard was unsuccessful.
As discussed earlier, OSHA has to make find-
ings of fact with regard to both the significance of
the risk and the feasibility of a proposed standard.
Unfortunately, OSHA has pulled back from its his-
torically protective determinations of these factors
by (a) being content to regulate near the 1 per 1,000
lifetime risk, which was the lower bound of signif-
icance suggested by the U.S. Supreme Court in its
benzene decision; and (b) finding gratuitously that a
proposed standard is feasible, rather than protecting
workers to the extent feasible—that is, to the limits
of feasibility, using its technology-forcing author-
ity. A study undertaken by the now-defunct Con-
gressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA)
examined the postpromulgation costs of past OSHA
standards (including vinyl chloride, ethylene oxide,
lead, cotton dust, and formaldehyde) and, in gen-
eral, found them to be a fraction of the prepromul-
gation estimates. The OTA concluded:
OSHA’s current economic and technological
feasibility analyses devote little attention to the
potential of advanced or emerging technologies to
yield technically and economically superior
methods for achieving reductions in workplace
hazards. . . . Opportunities are missed to harness
leading-edge or innovative production
technologies (including input substitution,
process redesign, or product reformulation) to
society’s collective advantage, and to achieve
greater worker protection with technologically
and economically superior means.
[I]ntelligently directed effort can yield hazard
control options—attributes that would, no doubt,
enhance the “win-win” (for regulated industries
and their workforces) character of OSHA’s
compliance requirements in many cases and
support the achievement of greater hazard
reduction.
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Thus, OSHA in no way seems to be pushing regu-
lation to its limits of technology.5
OSHA ran into tremendous industry resistance
to a proposed ergonomics standard. Congress actu-
ally repealed the standard under recently new con-
gressional authority, and OSHA ultimately with-
drew the standard. However, OSHA has made it
clear the employer has obligations to protect work-
ers from ergonomic hazards under the general duty
clause and that enforcement activity will be applied
in appropriate situations. The Review Commission
upheld OSHA’s authority to use the general duty
clause in these circumstances. OSHA also experi-
enced political difficulty in establishing standards
for secondary tobacco smoke (environmental to-
bacco smoke) as part of its concern for indoor air
quality. OSHA issued a proposed rule in 1994, but
action is yet to be taken.
The Clinton administration’s record on worker
protection was not impressive. No new health stan-
dards for chemicals had been issued. The two
standards that were issued for 1,3-butadiene and
methylene chloride had actually been proposed
in the Bush administration prior to Clinton’s.
In the first George W. Bush administration,
OSHA not only withdrew the proposed ergonomic
standard, it also withdrew its plans for issuing a
rule on metal-working fluids. OSHA does plan
the promulgation of some new standards and
the review/reconsideration of standards more than
10 years old as required by the Regulatory Flex-
ibility Act. After a successful court challenge,
in 2004, OSHA finally issued a proposed revi-
sion of its 8-hour exposure limit for hexavalent
chromium, lowering the standard to 1µg/m3 from
the previous 33-year-old standard of 52 µg/m3,
thus preventing 350 excess cancers annually. A
peer review for a risk assessment for silica ex-
posure was scheduled for February 2005, but,
as of mid-2005, a proposed rule was not yet
scheduled. Initial action on beryllium was sched-
uled for early 2005, but no action has yet been
taken. In addition, a rule was planned for re-
quirements for employers to pay for personal pro-
tective equipment. Four older standards are also
being reviewed: lock-out/tag-out, ethylene oxide,
cotton dust, and grain-handling facilities. Also un-
der consideration for revision is a rule for the
Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous
Chemicals, to add other reactive chemicals to
the rule and to bring it more in line with the
EPA’s Risk Management Plan. As provided by
the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fair-
ness Act, the effects of revisited standards on
small business must be assessed, and that assess-
ment is now reviewable by the circuit courts of
appeals.
With only enough inspectors to inspect 2 per-
cent of the 6 million worksites covered by the
OSHAct each year, OSHA has historically used a
variety of targeting schemes to decide which sites
get inspected. Nearly half of the inspections are re-
served to respond to worker complaints, referrals
from other agencies, or reports of major or fatal in-
cidents. Begun in mid-2003, OSHA’s Site-Specific
Targeting (SST) Inspection program selects work-
places with high lost-workday injury and illness
rates for inspections from self-reported survey data
of about 80,000 employers (mainly mid-sized or
larger employers with the lower cutoff at about 40
employees). Lost-workday injury and illness rates
are dominated by injuries, and workplace expo-
sures to harmful substances are acknowledged to
be grossly underreported, thus biasing the strategy.
Out of the approximately 35,000 inspections OSHA
conducts each year, about 3,000 are SST-based. Fur-
ther, based on the 2003 survey of recorded injuries
and illnesses, OSHA contacted about 13,000 high-
hazard sites, notifying them that their injury rates
are above average (usually greater than twice the
average) and advising them to seek safety consul-
tations and that they would be targeted for ran-
dom inspections. Those with four times the national
average would be targeted for “wall-to-wall in-
spections.” These 13,000 worksites contribute ap-
proximately 20 percent of the 3 million (re-
ported) lost-workday cases annually. In addition
to the national targeting strategy, special em-
phasis programs for specific hazards in selected
industrial sectors are conducted at the regional
level.
In the current antiregulatory climate, OSHA has,
as have other regulatory agencies, shifted toward
more voluntary initiatives, including the use of
expert advisors, outreach, compliance assistance,
consultation, and partnering with industry, trade
unions, and workers. OSHA has designated Spe-
cial Emphasis Programs and Initiatives on silicosis,
mechanical power press injuries, lead in construc-
tion, nursing home accidents, and workplace vio-
lence. These programs and initiatives target a spe-
cific occupational hazard or industry and combine
outreach and education with enforcement. OSHA
has issued to its field staff a Directive on Strategic
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T A B L E 3 - 3
Summary of OSHA’s Four Voluntary Compliance Programs
Program and Year






reviews of employers’ worksites
to identify hazards and
abatement techniques.
Program operates in all





Single worksites typically with
injury and illness rates below
average for their industry
sector.
Recognizes worksites that have
safety and health programs
with specific features that
exceed OSHA standards.
Employers must pass a
weeklong on-site worksite
review by OSHA personnel.
Participants complete yearly
self-evaluations. OSHA




Priority for participation is
given to groups of employers
and employees in
high-hazard workplaces, with




OSHA and partners to address a
specific safety and health
problem.
OSHA conducts verification
inspections for a percentage
of partner worksites to









that focus on training,
outreach, and promoting the
consciousness of safety and
health issues.
OSHA meets quarterly with
participants to ensure
progress toward alliance
goals is being met.
a Although the Occupational health and Safety Administration (OSHA) had partnership agreements prior to 1998, the Strategic Partnership
Program was not formalized until that year.
Source: General Accounting Office (GAO) analysis.
Partnerships for Worker Safety and Health. OSHA
Strategic Partnerships are intended to establish co-
operative efforts at improving health and safety.
However, OSHA continues to favor the more volun-
tary initiatives of voluntary protection programs—
which it intends to expand tenfold—and alliances
discussed below. All in all, the United States stands
out in its slow, if not reluctant, approach to pro-
tect workers sufficiently with all the tools at its
disposal.
The GAO recently reviewed OSHA’s four vol-
untary initiatives and concluded that OSHA had not
collected the data necessary to evaluate their effec-
tives. GAO describes the four voluntary compliance
programs as follows (Table 3-3):
(Through) the Voluntary Protection Programs
(VPP), the State Consultation Program, the
Strategic Partnership Program, and the Alliance
Program,∗ OSHA has extended its reach to a
growing number of employers. While worksites
directly involved in these programs represent a
small fraction of the 7 million sites over which
OSHA has authority, their numbers suggest an
expansion in the number of employers the agency
∗
The State Consultation and the Strategic Partnership
programs are sometimes referred to by slightly different
names. The State Consultation Program is also known as
the Onsite Consultation Program and the Consultation
Program and the Strategic Partnership Program is also
known as OSHA Strategic Partnerships for Worker Safety
and Health.
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is able to reach through enforcement. OSHA’s
four voluntary compliance programs have
involved employers both directly and indirectly
through trade and professional associations. These
programs represent a mix of strategies designed to
reach different types of employers, including
those that recognize employers with exemplary
safety and health practices and programs designed
to address serious hazards in workplaces. The
State Consultation Program—a state run, but
largely OSHA-funded, program—provides
consultations, usually confidentially, to small
businesses in high-hazard industries and exempts
worksites that meet certain standards from routine
inspections. Almost 29,000 consultation visits
were made in 2003 as a part of this program. The
VPP recognizes employers with exemplary safety
records and practices by exempting them from
routine inspections. The VPP has grown
substantially over the past decade and currently
includes over 1,000 worksites. The Strategic
Partnership Program encourages employers in
hazardous industries to develop measures for
eliminating serious hazards. To date, there are
more than 200 partnerships. In the Alliance
Program, OSHA has collaborated with more than
160 organizations, such as trade and professional
associations, to promote better safety and health
practices for their members. To support all of its
voluntary compliance strategies, OSHA has
increased the proportion of resources dedicated to
them from about 20 percent of its total budget in
fiscal year 1996 to about 28 percent in 2003. The
agency also plans to expand its voluntary
compliance programs in the future, although
national and regional OSHA officials we
interviewed acknowledged that doing so would be
difficult given the agency’s current resources. For
example, OSHA plans an eightfold increase in the
number of worksites for the VPP, from 1,000 to
8,000. OSHA’s voluntary compliance programs
have reduced injuries and illnesses and yielded
other benefits, according to participants, OSHA
officials, and occupational safety and health
specialists, but the lack of comprehensive data
makes it difficult to fully assess the effectiveness
of these programs. Participants we interviewed in
the three states and nine worksites we visited told
us they have considerably reduced their rates of
injury and illness. They also attributed better
working relationships with OSHA, improved
productivity, and decreased worker compensation
costs to their involvement in the voluntary
compliance programs. However, much of the
information on program success was anecdotal,
and OSHA’s own evaluation of program activities
and impact has been limited to date. OSHA
currently does not collect complete, comparable
data that would enable a full evaluation of the
effectiveness of its voluntary compliance
programs. For example, OSHA requires
participants in the Strategic Partnership Program
to file annual reports but does not collect
consistent information about each partnership.
The agency has begun planning but has yet to
develop performance measures to use in
evaluating the programs and a strategic
framework that will allow it to set priorities and
effectively allocate its resources.
In addition to these formal programs, OSHA con-
ducts other compliance assistance activities, such
as outreach and training activities, to aid employers
in complying with OSHA standards and to educate






As with OSHA, EPA has underperformed in
its effort to implement the legislation under its
authority.6 TSCA is internally regarded as a “dead
letter” when it comes to the regulation of toxics and
continues to move slowly on the testing of chem-
icals. As of mid-2005, the number of significant
final rules promulgated by EPA under all the leg-
islation under its authority during the two George
W. Bush administrations was 11, compared to 31
and 40 in the two Clinton administrations and 31
under the first Bush administration. In 2004, EPA
withdrew 25 items from its regulatory agenda, 12
of them coming from Clean Water Act items. Dur-
ing the first administration of George W. Bush, there
have been 90 withdrawals as of September 2004: 39
from Clean Air Act planned action. 16 from Clean
Water Act actions, and 12 from RCRA actions. EPA
is resource-strapped but also without determined
leadership. As of June 2004, EPA failed to achieve
fully 73 percent of the benchmarks announced in
its December 2003 agenda.
Like OSHA, EPA has invested its efforts in
voluntary and conciliatory overtures to industry.
What is euphemistically called regulatory reinven-
tion was begun (at least under that name) in the
Clinton administration and continues today in
evolving forms. The most prominent early exam-
ple was EPA’s Common Sense Initiative (CSI),
wherein the agency assembled groups of interested
parties to focus on regulatory issues concerning
a particular industry sector, such as automobile
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manufacturing, with an eye toward developing
“cleaner, cheaper, smarter” ways of reducing or
preventing pollution. In contrast, EPA’s Project
XL focused on negotiations with individual firms.
Both programs have now been phased out, and
the Bush administration’s National Environmental
Performance Track program is now occupying cen-
ter stage in regulatory reinvention. This program
focuses on creating partnerships with individual
firms in which the firms agree to exceed regulatory
requirements, implement environmental manage-
ment systems, work closely with their communi-
ties, and set 3-year goals to improve continuously
their environmental performance in exchange for
reduced priority status for inspections, reduced reg-
ulatory, administrative, and reporting requirements,
and positive public recognition.∗ The program is
too new to evaluate for inclusion in this writing.
OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND
SAFETY IN BRITISH COLUMBIA
The discussion in this chapter has focused on oc-
cupational health and safety in the United States.
The system in British Columbia, Canada, is very
different and provides another useful perspective.
(The following is based on a 1997 analysis of that
system.)
Profile of British Columbia
British Columbia is Canada’s third-largest
province, with 1.4 million workers of a total
population of 3 million people. Thirty-seven
percent of the workers are unionized, compared
with approximately 15 percent in the United States.
Ninety-five percent of the firms have 50 or fewer
workers, and 75 percent have five or fewer workers.
Administrative Structure
In British Columbia, the occupational safety and
health regulation and enforcement activities and
the workers’ compensation system are part of
the same administrative public corporation, the
Workers’ Compensation Board (WCB), and both
are funded by assessed premiums on employers
(see Box 4-2). The WCB is administered by a
∗
Approximately 350 firms have joined the program from a
diverse cross-section of the economy. In contrast to
Project XL, regulatory flexibility seems to relate to
discretionary activities of agency inspection and
reporting policies rather than to extensive exclusion of
individual firms from mandatory regulatory provisions.
See <http://www.epa.gov/performancetrack>.
panel of administrators appointed by the Minister of
Labour.
The Prevention Division (formerly the
Occupational Safety and Health Division) employs
approximately 400 people, which would translate
into 28,000 for the United States (compared with
the actual number of approximately 2,000). The
annual division budget would be equivalent to a
U.S. $1.5 billion budget for OSHA, five times
larger than the amount actually allocated in the
United States.
Legal/Structural Basis
Two provincial pieces of legislation—the Work-
ers’ Compensation Act (see Chapter 4) and the
Workplace Act—provide the basis for the WCB’s
standard-setting authority. The federal Workplace
Hazardous Materials Information System serves as
the basis for provincial right-to-know activities. The
Panel of Administrators adopts regulations, with
the assistance of a tripartite Regulation Advisory
Committee, including professionals from the di-
vision, which was responsible for developing new
regulations and revising older ones during the last
extensive regulation review process. A Policy Bu-
reau in the division provides advice to the Panel
of Administrators concerning the final regulations.
Thereafter, there is no legal mechanism to chal-
lenge the regulations in the British Columbia sys-
tem. Thus, the development of regulatory policy by
the courts discussed for the U.S. system does not
exist in British Columbia, for all practical purposes.
Enforcement
Historically, British Columbia standards have not
been technology forcing. For example, until 1993
the lead standard permitted exposures up to
150 µg/m3, compared with the U.S. standard of
50 µg/m3. First-instance citations (mandatory ci-
tations on discovery of violations) exist only for
a few, mostly safety, violations. There is pressure
to include specific chemical exposures and fail-
ure of the employer to provide an adequate health
and safety program/health and safety committee in
the list of violations requiring first-instance cita-
tions. The Prevention Division can and does impose
penalty assessments; criminal penalties are rarely
issued. Labor participates in the WCB’s enforce-
ment and appellate process in a significant way.
Inspection activity is targeted by a combina-
tion of industry hazard classification, payroll, com-
pensation claims, and inspector experience through
a rational targeting system called WorkSafe. The
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construction and logging industries are targeted for
special attention because of their high-hazard na-
ture and poor claims experience. The Prevention
Division places serious emphasis on its data collec-
tion and analysis activities, which appear to be more
useful than those of OSHA and the Bureau of La-
bor Statistics. Accident reporting, which is being
computerized, increasingly provides the informa-
tion needed to focus prevention activities, such as
the cause of the accident, rather the cause of the in-
jury. The Prevention Division is implementing the
Diamond Project, which, like OSHA’s Cooperative
Compliance Program, is based on the Maine 200
Program, and seeks to shift responsibility to firms
and workers when justified by a good record of oc-
cupational injuries (and diseases).
Consultation
Most inspection activity results in warnings and cor-
rective orders rather than monetary penalties on the
employer. Some consultation and technical assis-
tance is usually rendered by the inspector at the
time of the inspection or closing conference. The
division provides engineering guidance and advice
to employers in the form of technical bulletins and
on-site consultation. The WCB also has an active
first-aid certification program for workplace-based
first-aid attendants, which is required by law. The
WCB does not charge a fee for consulting advice
or laboratory assistance/analysis.
Worker Participation
Workplace safety and health programs are required
to be provided by all employers with a workforce of
50 or more employees (5 percent of the firms). For
especially hazardous industries, the programs are
required for employers with a workforce of 20 or
more employees. Joint workplace safety and health
committees are considered an essential part of these
programs. There is pressure to expand the number
of firms required to have such a program. Workers
complain that they need more authority in the func-
tions of the safety and health committees. They also
complain of the inadequacy of the antidiscrimina-
tion provisions of the current law/structure, such as
in relation to the right to refuse hazardous work.
Comment
Features of the British Columbia system suggest
possible U.S. OSHA reforms, such as mandatory
health and safety programs and committees, greater
recognition of occupational disease, a streamlined
standard-setting process, and a linkage of compen-
sation and prevention activities. The period since
1970 has revealed both the strengths and weak-
nesses of the U.S. system, including the need to
strengthen the connection between OSHA and the
EPA through the OSHAct, TSCA, and the safety
provisions of the Clean Air Amendments.
OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND
SAFETY IN THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY
Occupational health and safety legislation in in-
dividual European countries is in a great deal of
flux after the formation of the European Commu-
nity (EC), now the European Union (EU). (The fol-
lowing is based on a 1998 analysis.) The Single
European Act establishing the EC was enacted in
1987. Article 118A of the act addresses employ-
ment, working conditions, and occupational health
and safety and provides a streamlined legislative
process for the development of health and safety
directives and minimum health and safety stan-
dards affecting approximately 150 million people.
The EC directives have the force of law and set
down general principles for the protection of work-
ers. However, individual countries are obligated to
adopt national legislation implementing these prin-
ciples, with important technical details concerning
enforcement and administration left to the EC mem-
ber states. Thus, programs may be expected to differ
considerably among countries in the near future, al-
though these differences may narrow as European
integration becomes a reality. Therefore, it may be
some time before innovations in health and safety
regulatory approaches can be evaluated and serve as
models for OSHA reform in the United States. Nev-
ertheless, the EC experience may be important for
the United States because (a) with the formation of
a North American Free Trade Zone, the problems of
harmonization of legislation may be similar; (b) the
EC will be an important force in occupational safety
and health; and (c) the EC will be a major trade com-
petitor. The recent agreement between the EC and
the European Free Trade Association countries to
set up a free trade area means that the EC safety
and health legislation is applicable in 19 countries
in Europe.
Legal and Structural Basis
Regulatory activity within the EC can include
regulations, decisions, directives, resolutions, and
recommendations, varying from commitments in
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principle to legally enforceable mandates on the
Member States. The European Commission, aided
by expert groups, makes formal proposals to the EC
Council of Ministers. The council, in consultation
with the Economic and Social Committee and the
European Parliament, adopts, rejects, or modifies
the proposals and issues directives by a qualified
majority vote of 54 of a total of 76. Individual mem-
ber states can maintain or introduce more stringent
measures for the protection of working conditions
than those contained in the directives.
Until 1988, EC directives, such as those dealing
with occupational exposure limits for vinyl chlo-
ride, lead, asbestos, and benzene, were very detailed
and prescriptive. STELs were also specified. After
Article 118A was enacted, a more general Frame-
work Directive 89/391/EEC “on the introduction of
measures to encourage improvements in the safety
and health of workers at work” was issued. This di-
rective is the centerpiece of EC health and safety
policy and establishes the guiding principles on
which more specific directives are issued. There
are now seven so-called daughter directives to the
Framework Directive. Directive 90/394/EEC ad-
dresses carcinogens at work. Directive 88/642/EEC
addresses risks related to exposure to chemicals and
physical and biological agents at work and has led to
some 27 indicative limit values (ILVs), which are
advisory only. The enforcement of those limits is
left to the individual regulatory systems and styles
of the various member states. Nevertheless, there
is a preferred hierarchy of control for “dangerous
substances and products.” In order of preference,
these are substitution of dangerous substances by
safe or less dangerous ones, the use of closed sys-
tems or processes, local extractive ventilation, gen-
eral workplace ventilation, and personal protective
equipment.
Other EC directives address biological agents,
asbestos, video display terminals, work equipment,
personal protective equipment, and handling of
loads. In 1988, the European Parliament adopted
a Resolution on Indoor Air Quality, which is re-
ceiving attention for development into a directive.
All commission proposals are submitted to
the Advisory Committee on Safety, Hygiene
and Health Protection at Work, composed of
representatives of employers, workers, and govern-
ments. Initially, an expert scientific group evalu-
ates all scientific data relevant to protecting work-
ers from a particular substance. The commission
makes a proposal and solicits Advisory Committee
opinion. The Technical Progress Committee votes
on the proposal. The limit values may be adopted
as indicative values by commission directive. If the
exposure limits are mandatory, they are adopted by
the Council of Ministers as directives pursuant to
Article 118A. Compared with the United States, rel-
atively few health standards have been established,
reflecting the slowness of the tripartite process of
participatory standard setting envisioned by the EC.
The Framework Directive applies to all sectors
of employment activity, both public and private.
However, it excludes the self-employed and do-
mestic workers. Employers have a general “duty
to ensure the safety and health of workers in every
aspect related to the work” (Article 5.1). Among the
employer’s specific duties are (a) to evaluate risks
in the choice of work equipment, chemicals, and
design of the workplace; (b) to integrate preven-
tion into the company’s operations at all levels; (c)
to inform workers or their representatives of risks
and preventive measures taken; (d) to consult work-
ers or their representatives on all health and safety
matters; (e) to train workers on workplace hazards;
(f) to provide appropriate health surveillance; (g) to
protect especially sensitive risk groups; and (h) to
keep records of accidents and injuries.
Enforcement
Labor inspectorates in each member state have the
responsibility to ensure employer compliance with
health and safety requirements. However, beyond
broad principles and duties, the EC directives are
often advisory, and not many specific requirements
are enforceable through EC channels. Attempts to
place binding obligations on national governments
to establish the necessary institutional elements to
support proper implementation of safety and health
regulations, such as health and safety technical cen-
ters, have been unsuccessful. The commission es-
tablished a Committee of Senior Labor Inspectors
in 1982 to facilitate information exchange to en-
courage coordination of policy. The commission
also established the European Agency for Safety
and Health at Work in Bilbao, Spain.
The commission does have the authority to bring
action against a member state for failure to adhere
to EC directives, but the commission does not yet
have the institutional capacity to monitor compli-
ance effectively. Action against a member state has
never been brought, however, even though some
countries have not adopted national legislation to
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conform with specific mandatory exposure limits,
such as for noise. No uniform policy on enforce-
ment of standards, such as first-instance citations
or penalty levels, exists, and it is likely that inter-
country variations will be allowed.
Worker Participation
The Framework Directive calls for “the informing,
consultation, balanced participation . . . and train-
ing of workers and their representatives” to improve
health and safety at the workplace (Article 1.2). The
directive gives workers the rights to consult in ad-
vance with their employers on health/safety mat-
ters, to be paid for safety activities, to communicate
with labor inspectors, and to exercise the right to
refuse dangerous work. Safety committees are not
explicitly addressed by the directive, although many
European countries have required them in transpos-
ing the directive into national law. Similarly, joint
decision-making is not mandated but may occur in
practice.
Comment
The health and safety policy of the EC is evolv-
ing. Although the general principles declared in EC
legislation and specific directives are laudable, it re-
mains to be seen what course implementation will
take and how much variation will continue to exist
among the different member states. European reg-
ulatory systems tend to be more advisory. On the
other hand, they are also more participatory, invit-
ing decision making on a tripartite basis.
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